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Abstract
The purpose of the current study was to examine cognitive distortions as a mediator
between maladaptive schema and hopelessness. With hopelessness and suicidal
behavior so strongly correlated, an examination of hopelessness is critical. It was
expected that this study would shed light on the role of distorted thinking as it
relates to beliefs shaped from early maladaptive experiences and hopelessness.
First, distorted thinking was not found to partially mediate the relationship between
early maladaptive schema and hopelessness. This was likely a consequence of
multicollinearity due to the use of a very proximal mediator. Second, a linear
combination of the cognitive distortions Magnification, Fortune-Telling, and
Jumping to Conclusions was shown to play a significant role in hopeless thinking.
Lastly, this study provided further psychometric support for the Inventory of Cognitive
Distortions (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002).
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Chapter One: Introduction
Statement of the Problem
Approximately 105 suicides occur in the United States each day, which is about
one suicide every .07 minutes. Since 2000, annual suicide rates have steadily increased
from 29,350 to 38,364 in 2010. These statistics make suicide the tenth leading cause of
death overall. Additionally, for every completed suicide, approximately six people are
personally affected (e.g., friends, family members; American Association of Suicidology,
2010).
Given the tremendous toll that suicide takes on patients, family, and the
community, the identification of epidemiologic, as well as cognitive, behavioral, and
environmental risk factors for suicide will enable psychologists to develop more effective
preventions and interventions. Current research suggests that more than 90% of those
who attempt or complete suicide have one or more mental illnesses. At particular risk are
those individuals who suffer from depression (Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Henriksson et
al., 1993). The presence of depression has been shown to increase the probability of
completed suicide by 50% (American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, 2008). Though
depression is a particularly strong risk factor in suicidal behavior, hopelessness, a
cognitive risk factor, has been identified as a strong warning sign in individuals who
complete suicide (Beck & Weishaar, 1990).
Hopelessness is defined as a future-oriented state of negative expectation in
which the individual with hopelessness believes (a) positive outcomes will not occur, (b)
negative outcomes will occur, and (c) the individual is helpless to affect the negative
outcome of events (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Researchers have
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demonstrated that psychological disorders such as depression create a bias in information
processing that leads to automatic patterns of thinking that are characterized by
pessimism, negativity and unrealistic interpretation. This process begins when
underlying structures that help organize the environment, called schemas, are activated
by environmental stressors and give way to distorted patterns of thinking (Wright &
Beck, 1983). These thinking distortions fuel the individual’s view of his or her future as
hopeless.
The current high rate of suicide suggests that there is more research to be done in
this area. The exploration of the cognitive factors in suicidal individuals can lead to
better identification of epidemiological markers and to improved prevention and
treatment of those who are suicidal.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine cognitive distortions as a mediator
between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness. To date, no studies have examined
the relationship between early maladaptive schema and distorted thinking as it relates to
hopelessness. Because hopelessness is a risk factor and warning sign in suicidal behavior
researchers must illuminate how hopelessness develops and is identified in clinical
populations. The hope is that this study would help practitioners to understand further
the mechanisms through which distorted thinking leads to hopelessness and would
contribute to research on suicide prevention and treatment in the field of psychology.
Overview of Literature Review
Early research identified early maladaptive schemas in self-report inventories like
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978), while later work of
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cognitive psychologists highlighted differences in information processing of subjects
with depression (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Dobson & Shaw, 1987). Cognitive theory
espouses that early maladaptive schema is latent until triggered by external stressors. The
principal product of early maladaptive schema is biased information processing, which
distorts an individual’s perception and thoughts.
Evidence of cognitive distortions has been found in the sexual offender
(Blumenthal, Gudjonsson, & Burns, 1999), the child and adolescent (Leitenberg, Yost, &
Carroll-Wilson, 1986; Weems, Berman, Silverman, & Saavedra, 2001), depression
(DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977), and behavioral health literature (Turk & Rudy, 1992).
The literature strongly suggests that distorted thinking plays a role in the development
and maintenance of a number of emotional states.
Hopelessness is correlated with depression and even more strongly correlated
with suicide (Minkoff, Bergman, Beck & Beck, 1973). The predominant theories of
hopelessness are those of Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) and Abramson et al.
(1989). Currently, evidence suggests the role of early maladaptive schema and distorted
cognitions in the development of hopelessness (Haaga, Ernst, & Dyck, 1991).
Relevance to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
The current study is relevant to cognitive behavioral therapy in a number of ways.
First, the theoretical foundation of both the cognitive theories of depression and
hopelessness are based on information-processing theory. Cognitive processes and faulty
information processing are at the core of psychiatric illness and play a considerable role
in the maintenance of psychological dysfunction.
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Second, early maladaptive schemas, cognitive structures that organize and guide
behavior, are theorized to act as a bias that distorts perception and thinking. Schema
therapy is a relatively recent treatment in cognitive behavioral therapy, which attempts to
alter these deep maladaptive cognitive structures (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003).
Third, the development of hopelessness is theorized to be intimately connected to
distorted thinking. Abramson et al.’s (1989) hopelessness theory and Beck et al.’s (1979)
cognitive theory of depression espouse that cognitions are one of the principal
components in the development of hopelessness. Additionally, recognizing and disputing
distorted thinking is widely accepted as an efficacious cognitive approach in the
treatment of psychological disorders like depression.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Definition of Schemas
In its broadest sense, a schema is a configuration or structure. Schema definition
poses problems because schemas represent constructs in the mind that cannot be isolated
or measured (Oei & Baranoff, 2007). A number of authors have attempted to
characterize and define schemas, and their definitions have more in common than not,
with the major divergence being whether schemas represent cognitive structures or
beliefs (Layden, Newman, Freeman, & Byers Morse, 1993).
For example, in his earlier work, Beck (1964) defined schemas as cognitive
structures that aid in screening, coding, and evaluating. They “abstract and mold the raw
data into thoughts and cognitions” (p. 562). Therefore, Beck’s view of schemas was that
they are cognitive structures of which the product was cognitive content. In a later work,
Beck and Clark (1988) described schemas as “functional structures of relatively enduring
representations of prior knowledge and experience” (p. 24). Clark, Beck, and Alford
(1999) elaborated upon this idea and defined schemas as “relatively enduring internal
cognitive structures of stored generic or prototypical features of stimuli, ideas, or
experiences that are used to organize new information in a meaningful way thereby
determining how phenomena are perceived and conceptualized” (p. 79).
Alternatively, Padesky (1994) chose to refer to schemas as core beliefs, as did
Beck, Brown, et al. (1990), who referred to them as “cognitive schemas or controlling
beliefs” (p. 4), giving the impression that schemas and cognitive content are
interchangeable, rather than separate constructs. This gives the impression that in a
clinical context, fine distinctions need not be made. For the purpose of consistency, the
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following definition will be used in the current research: “A broad pervasive theme or
pattern comprised of memories, emotions, cognitions, and bodily sensations regarding
oneself and one’s relationships with others, developed during childhood or adolescence,
elaborated throughout one’s lifetime and dysfunctional to a significant degree” (Young et
al., 2003, p. 7).
Characteristics of Schemas
As a result of the difficulty defining and measuring the schema construct, many
authors have attempted to identify important characteristics of schema. The following
characteristics are outlined in the literature:
1. Schemas summarize important information about objects and events (Cowan,
Pines, & Meltzer, 1999).
2. Schemas represent environmental information in a way that helps individuals
internalize it (Cowan et al., 1999).
3. Schemas assimilate environmental stimuli in a way that is consistent with their
organization (i.e., they create a bias in processing; Cowan et al., 1999).
4. Information from the environment can alter schemas (i.e., schemas can be
changed; Cowan et al., 1999).
5. Schemas are templates that are used to predict future states of the environment
(Cowan et al., 1999).
6. Schemas can contain other schemas (e.g., “I’m physically unattractive” may
encompass schemas about the hair, body shape and weight, nose, skin, etc.;
Cowan et al., 1999).

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS
7. Schemas can be either positive and adaptive or negative and maladaptive (Alford
& Beck, 1997; Cowan et al., 1999; Young et al., 2003).
8. Schemas can have differing degrees of valence, meaning they may be latent (i.e.,
not biasing information processing) or hypervalent (i.e., almost continually
activated) at different points in time (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990).
9. Schema rigidity exists on a continuum from flexible to rigid. This continuum
influences schemas’ ability to be modified or changed via psychological
intervention (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990).
10. Schemas can be narrow, discrete, or broad in focus (e.g., “My nose is pointy” vs.
“I’m physically unattractive”; Cowan et al., 1999).
In the context of emotional disorders, it is important to recognize that once
formed, schemas guide information processing by biasing which information from an
individual’s environment is selected, encoded, organized, stored, and retrieved. In this
way, schemas act as filters that dictate how one perceives him or herself, others, and the
environment (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005). Schemas act upon raw sensory data,
which allows individuals to make sense of incoming data that may not have particular
meanings or context of their own (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990).
Historical Roots of Schemas
The notion of schemas has been cited back to the early Greek philosophers such
as Chrysippus (ca. 297-206 B.C.) and Plato (ca. 423-338 B.C.; Young et al., 2003), both
of whom are credited with helping define schemas’ chief property as a “reduced
description of important aspects of an object or event” (Cowan et al., 1999, p. 265). In
the 18th century, Kant proposed a “product of the imagination” to explain mental
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representation and its association with the outside world (Kant, 1855, p. 109). Piaget is
generally given credit for coining the term “schema” as it is used today (Young et al.,
2003).
Piaget was the first psychologist to examine the notion of schemas. His major
contribution to the concept of schemas was assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation is the idea that schemas aid the integration of new environmental
information (Cowan et al., 1999). For example, an infant’s feeding schema involves the
sequence of grasping the breast with his or her mouth and sucking. Later, the infant is
introduced to bottle-feeding and the mother’s nipple is replaced by a manufactured rubber
nipple. Through assimilation, Piaget proposed that the infant would incorporate novel
stimuli from the environment (i.e., the rubber nipple) into his or her existing schema for
feeding (i.e., grasping and sucking the mother’s nipple). Thus, information from his or
her environment is integrated into a preexisting schema for feeding.
Piaget also noted that individuals are confronted with environmental stimuli that
do not fit already established schemas, thereby requiring a shift in current schemas. Here
the individual adds new information that expands existing schemas, a process Piaget
referred to as accommodation. For example, when a baby begins spoon-feeding, he or
she may first suck the spoon as was done earlier with the breast and bottle. In time,
through accommodation, the baby will change his or her behavior and make room for this
new information (i.e., eating from a spoon), thus expanding the existing feeding schema.
Piaget believed that both assimilation and accommodation allowed individuals to learn
and adapt to novel stimuli in their environments (Cowan et al., 1999).

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS
While Piaget pioneered the notion of schemas in terms of cognitive development
and learning, Bartlett examined the role of schemas in constructive memory. Bartlett
used the concept of schemas to examine how individuals reconstructed stories from
memory. In his most famous experiments, subjects read the Native American folk tale,
The War of the Ghosts, and were asked to recall the story over a period of hours, weeks,
months, and years (Cowan et al., 1999). Bartlett’s data suggested that memory “is an
active, dynamic, inferential process that is better characterized as constructive than
reproductive” (Johnston, 2001, p. 342) and characterized memory as predominantly
inaccurate. Subjects consistently made reproduction errors, such as omitting/adding
details and rationalizing vague content, in an attempt to explain, simplify, understand,
and accept it (Bartlett, 1932).
Bartlett explained this phenomenon in terms of cognitive schemas. According to
Bartlett, environmental stimuli are encoded by relating it to similar events and already
stored encoded information. Bartlett made several critical contributions to the
development of schema theory during his research on memory. First, a person’s
experiences and reactions play out on future experiences. That is, perception is
constructed based on past experiences in similar situations. Second, because of their
reliance on experiences, schemas allow individuals to forecast, plan, and carry out
behavior (Bartlett, 1932). Third, and most relevant to this research, schemas can be
either adaptive or maladaptive (Cowan et al., 1999). In this sense, schemas allow for
memory and judgment errors via the distortion of incoming information.
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Schematic Processing Theories of Emotional Dysfunction
In the 1960s, Beck adapted existing notions of schema and information processing
to his cognitive theory of emotional dysfunction. He theorized that thinking emerges
from underlying attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs formed during early life experiences
(Yurica, 2002). The most cited schematic processing models in the field of psychology
are those of Beck (1997) and Young et al. (2003). Both will be described in detail.
According to Beck’s cognitive theory, schemas play a critical role in determining (a)
how an individual processes and assigns meaning to environmental stimuli, (b) the
information that the person attends to and remembers, (c) functional and dysfunctional
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns that increase vulnerability to clinical
syndromes, and (d) overall adaptation and functioning in general society. Beck’s past
model represented simple schematic processing. In this theory, schemas guided
information processing by biasing the information from an individual’s environment that
is selected, encoded, organized, stored and retrieved. More recently, his model of
schematic processing was altered to account for a number of problems in his earlier
theory (Alford & Beck, 1997; Beck, 1997; Clark et al., 1999).
Beck’s (1997) current model of schematic processing has added the concept of
modes to his theory. Modes are defined as “specific clusters of interrelated cognitiveconceptual, affective, physiological, behavioral and motivational schemas organized to
deal with particular demands placed on the organism” (Clark et al., 1999, p. 88). Modes,
or broad schema subsets, are offered rather than a simple cognitive schema to explain the
complexity seen in emotional and psychological dysfunction. Modes are viewed as either
primal (i.e., fundamental to survival) or minor (i.e., activities of everyday life that are
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learned and normally under conscious control) and make up the basic systems of
personality.
Beck’s concept of modes addresses five interrelated systems: (a) cognitive, (b)
affective, (c) motivational and behavioral, (d) physiological, and (e) conscious control
systems. The cognitive system is related to information processing, including data
selection, attention, assignment of meaning, memory, and recall. Beck (1997) described
memory as particularly significant in the cognitive system because memories of earlier
experiences can trigger reactions to current events. The affective system is related to
emotion and affect. These schemas influence how an individual feels. Beck espoused
that both positive and negative emotions exist to facilitate adaptation. Negative emotions
cue individuals to pay attention to situations that weaken or threaten well-being, whereas
positive emotions reinforce goal-directed behavior. The motivational and behavioral
system drives an individual’s behavior or lack thereof. Beck (1997) distinguished these
systems as automatic and outside of awareness and voluntary control. The motivational
and behavioral system encompasses emergency systems, such as fight, flight, or freeze,
and is automatic and tied to primal modes. Once triggered, these automatic impulses can
often be brought under conscious control. The physiological system is comprised of
schemas related to central nervous system activation or inhibition and directs the way
individuals assign meaning to physiological cues. For instance, the physiological
symptoms of muscle tension and increased adrenaline in anxiety enhance the flight
impulse (i.e., motivational and behavioral system), which is further reinforced by the
assignment of meaning to the symptoms that one is in danger (i.e., cognitive system).
The conscious control system differs from the aforementioned systems in that it is less

12
automatic and is under conscious control. It allows individuals to apply logic actively,
shift attention, activate behavior, and ignore unpleasant emotions.
The reaction to a given situation is believed to initiate activation of a primal mode
(e.g., danger, aggression, or defense), which activates the modal subsystem structure
(e.g., behavioral/motivational, affective, and physiological schemas) to produce a
multidimensional psychological dysfunction. In the case of a bridge phobia, for example,
the activating event of having to cross a bridge is processed through the person’s primal
mode for danger, which alerts the person to impending danger. This signal, in turn,
activates the related modal systems, including affective (e.g., increased anxiety),
physiological (e.g., increased heart rate), and motivational (e.g., impulse to escape). If
the person were to continue and cross the bridge in this state, he or she would utilize the
conscious control system to override the primal impulse to escape danger (Beck et al.,
2005).
The other most cited schematic processing theory is that of Young et al. (2003).
Young et al. (2003) conceptualized that schemas emerge primarily from unmet core
emotional needs. They identified the basic needs as (a) secure attachments to others; (b)
autonomy, competence, and a sense of identity; (c) freedom to express valid needs and
emotions, (d) spontaneity and play; and (e) realistic limits and self-control (p. 10). They
outlined 18 early maladaptive schemas under five domains.
Schemas under the Disconnection and Rejection domain are characterized by the
inability to form secure, satisfying attachments to others. Their families of origin are
typified by instability, abusiveness, rejection, and isolation.
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1. Abandonment/ Instability—Individuals with this schema believe significant
others to be emotionally inconsistent and unavailable (p. 13).
2. Mistrust/Abuse—Individuals with this schema have a general distrust of others
because they believe that they will be abused or exploited by others (p. 13).
3. Emotional Deprivation—Individuals with this schema hold the expectation that
adequate emotional support will not be provided by others (p. 13).
4. Defectiveness/Shame—Individuals with this schema believe they are inherently
flawed or bad and that others would not love them if these flaws were exposed (p.
13).
5. Social Isolation/Alienation—Individuals with this schema have a pervasive sense
of feeling different and not belonging to social groups or the larger society (p. 13).
The Impaired Autonomy and Performance domain includes schemas
characterized by an inability to separate from one’s family and to function independently
compared with one’s peers. Families of origin are often overprotective and neglectful in
a manner that impairs the individual’s development of self-confidence and selfsufficiency.
6. Dependence/Incompetence—Individuals with this schema feel unable to function
independently without help from others. Everyday responsibilities pose serious
obstacles to these individuals, who often lack self-efficacy and problem-solving
skills necessary to function independently in daily life (p. 18).
7. Vulnerability to Harm or Illness—These individuals can be characterized by
catastrophic thoughts about impending medical, emotional, and external disasters
and the belief that they cannot cope with these situations (p. 18).
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8. Enmeshment/Undeveloped Self—Individuals with this schema tend to be overly
involved with one or more significant others to the degree the relationship inhibits
individual and social development (p. 18).
9. Failure—Individuals with this schema believe failure is inevitable in areas of
performance. Beliefs about themselves include being unintelligent, untalented, or
unsuccessful (p. 18).
The Impaired Limits domain includes those individuals who have nonexistent or
underdeveloped internal limits and/or self-discipline. These individuals often have
difficulty respecting the rights of others and cooperating. Families of origin often include
overindulgent or permissive caregivers, and these individuals frequently present as
selfish, spoiled, irresponsible or narcissistic (p. 18).
10. Entitlement/Grandiosity—Individuals with this schema carry the belief they are
entitled to special rights and privileges because of their inherent superiority to
others. These beliefs often interfere with their ability to develop appropriate
empathy and adhere to the rules of healthy social relationships (p. 19).
11. Insufficient Self-Control/Self-Discipline—Individuals lack the ability or desire to
implement self-control or frustration tolerance necessary to achieve their goals.
They have difficulty regulating their emotions and often act impulsively (p. 19).
The Other-Directedness schema is characterized by meeting the needs of others to
the detriment of one’s own needs. Families of origin are often marked by conditional
acceptance and value of parental feelings above children’s.
12. Subjugation—Individuals with this schema give up control to others, which
functions to avoid negative feelings and abandonment. Their belief that their own
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needs are less important than those of others often leads to anger and resentment
(p. 19).
13. Self-Sacrifice—Similar to the subjugation schema, these individuals often put
their own needs second to those of others in an attempt to spare others pain, avoid
guilt, and increase self-esteem (p. 20).
14. Approval-Seeking/Recognition-Seeking—This schema is most closely related to
having an external locus of control. That is, rather than developing a secure sense
of self from within, it is entirely contingent on the approval and recognition of
others (p. 20).
The Overvigilance and Inhibition domain is characterized by suppression of
emotions and impulses. Individuals’ rules about performance are often directly
connected to their happiness in life. Families of origin often are exemplified by
hypervigilance about negative life events that lead to a negative life view. Individuals
often present as pessimistic and worrisome.
15. Negativity/Pessimism—Individuals with this schema focus on the negative
aspects of life. Their thinking is marked by the expectation that things will go
wrong, and they often focus on the negative stimuli while ignoring the positive (p.
20).
16. Emotional Inhibition—Individuals with this schema exhibit severe inhibition of
emotional expression, communication, or behavior in an attempt to avoid
disapproval of others, shame, or impulsivity (p. 20).
17. Unrelenting Standards/Hypercriticalness—Individuals with this schema strive to
meet very high, often unattainable standards to avoid criticism. This schema may
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present as perfectionism, excessive rules about life, and preoccupation with time
and efficiency (p. 21).
18. Punitiveness—Individuals with this schema maintain the conviction that they and
others should be punished for mistakes or imperfection.
Young et al. (2003) identified four themes of early life experiences that contribute
to the development of maladaptive schema in the aforementioned domains. The first is
when a child experiences too little love, stability, or understanding. The second is the
experience of traumatization or victimization. The third is when the child overidentifies
with and internalizes a parent’s thoughts, feelings, needs, or behaviors. The fourth is
when individuals are denied the opportunity to become self-sufficient (e.g., via
overprotectiveness) or not taught appropriate limits (e.g., via overindulgence). Other
research has shown correlations between early interactions with caregivers and later
personal and interpersonal maladjustment (Oei & Baranoff, 2007). These early
maladaptive experiences with caregivers are theorized to interact with a person’s
temperament (i.e., stable personality traits from birth) in the formation of maladaptive
schemas, which, in turn, lead to and maintain clinical psychopathology.
Maladaptive schemas comprise myriad emotions, cognitions, memories, and
physiological sensations related to early maladaptive experiences. In the child’s family
of origin, early maladaptive schemas were adaptive, but they become maladaptive outside
of the original familial context (Oei & Baranoff, 2007). Therefore, the early developed
schemas help children to understand and react to dysfunctional environments. Outside of
those dysfunctional environments (e.g., in adult relationships), the early formed schemas
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continue to play out, even in the absence of dysfunction. Young et al. (2003) suggested
that this characteristic of early maladaptive schemas helps ensure their maintenance.
Because of their early acquisition, schemas are familiar and trigger human beings’
need for consistency. That is, an individual will be drawn to experiences that trigger their
schemas. Their rigidity is, in part, caused by reinforcement of the comfort of familiarity.
Authors also identified “schema perpetuation” (Young et al., 2003, p. 30) in the
maintenance of early maladaptive schema. This perpetuation occurs primarily through
reinforcement by cognitions, behavior, and feelings.
Cognitive reinforcement occurs via cognitive distortions, which are errors in logic
that contribute to inaccurate perceptions of situations and interactions (Freeman, Pretzer,
Fleming, & Simon, 2004). Individuals look for information in situations and interactions
that confirm their schemas and ignore evidence that rejects them. Emotionally, they
avoid or inhibit feelings associated with schemas, thus preventing awareness of schemas
and any chance of correcting them. Behaviorally, individuals unconsciously choose
situations that trigger their schemas and elicit responses from others that provide
reinforcement of their schemas.
The perpetuation of schemas often elicits coping behaviors to reduce
psychological pain. Young et al. (2003) identified (a) overcompensation, (b) avoidance,
and (c) surrender as the three predominant behavioral coping styles of individuals with
early maladaptive schemas. Individuals also exhibit countless coping responses that
correlate with each of the styles. They often have a combination of coping styles and
responses depending on the situation. Overcompensation involves acting as though the
schema were not true. The reactions of individuals who utilize this style are often
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disproportionate to the circumstances of the situation. The avoidance style is
characterized by averting thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that may activate their
maladaptive schemas. These individuals may use distractions, ranging from thought
stopping to substance abuse, to avoid experiencing their schema. Schema surrender is a
coping style characterized by accepting the schema as true and giving into it. As adults,
these individuals tend to think and act in ways that perpetuate their childhood schemas.
As mentioned earlier, problems defining, assessing, and measuring schemas have
created obstacles to their empirical examination. The result is little empirical support for
their existence. However, schematic processing theories have gained support in the field.
For example, Oei and Baranoff (2007) acknowledged the clinical importance of easily
and reliably identifying schemas for which clinical interventions could be appropriately
implemented to decrease psychopathology. Unless addressed, schemas can confound
traditional cognitive therapy in a number of ways. First, because of their pervasiveness
and rigidity, schemas can inhibit the development of a sound therapeutic alliance.
Second, schemas can negatively affect goal setting in treatment. Third, schemas may
interfere with motivation and discipline (Young et al., 2003). Padesky (1994) also
discussed the effect of untreated schemas on the treatment process, including interference
with the therapeutic relationship. She believes schemas to be the driving force behind
cognitions and behaviors that characterize dysfunction.
Evidence of Schemas
Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977) examined schematic
frameworks that individuals use to understand verbal communication. Researchers
hypothesized that a person’s past experiences and worldview would influence his or her

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS

19

comprehension. Subjects were 30 college-aged women from an educational psychology
course for students planning a career in music education and 30 college-aged men from
two weight-lifting physical-education courses. Subjects were asked to read two passages
that could be interpreted differently. The first was about a prison escape that could have
also been interpreted as escaping a wrestling hold. The second, about a group coming
together to play cards, could have been interpreted also as an orchestra woodwind section
meeting for practice. All subjects were asked to read, engage in a delay activit,y and then
recall the passage. Afterward, subjects answered multiple-choice items that corresponded
with interpretations of the passage content.
Data suggested that subject background significantly influenced the way in which
subjects perceived the passage content. Those with aspirations to teach music were
significantly more likely to interpret the card-playing passage in a music context and
physical education majors to interpret the prison escape in a wrestling context.
Furthermore, more than 80% of subjects reported not recognizing possible alternative
interpretations in the passages. Researchers suggested that cognitive schemas, as
described by Bartlett (1932), influenced subject perception of passage content. Subject
responses showed they filled information gaps and distorted ambiguous passage content
in an attempt to assimilate the passage content with personal experience and knowledge
(Anderson et al., 1977). These results were especially promising because they utilized
research methodology that was stronger than Bartlett’s earlier, more primitive methods.
Sjogren and Timpson (1979) replicated the aforementioned study primarily
because of confounds related to participant sex. All of the music majors were women
while the physical education majors were men. This confound was addressed by using
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109 coed college-aged students majoring in either art or physical education. The second
modification to the study was to add titles, which were consistent with one of the two
possible interpretations, to some of the passages. Materials and procedure were nearly
identical to those of Anderson et al. (1977) and results were consistent with the earlier
study.
Data suggested there was a title effect that made interpretation of the passages
less ambiguous. This stated, not all subjects gave interpretations consistent with the
passage title. Authors found the effect of subject sex to be partly responsible for the
results of the original Anderson et al. (1977) study. However, the data supported
differences in passage interpretation resulting from subject background (Sjogren &
Timpson, 1979). Overall, Anderson et al.’s (1977) original findings were supported.
Another study examined the relationship between cultural schemas and reading
comprehension in a sample of 105 African American and Caucasian eighth graders
(Reynolds, Taylor, Steffenson, Shirey, & Anderson, 1982). Researchers asked subjects
to read about “playing the dozens,” an oral tradition in African American culture in
which insults are traded between two male participants until one fails to come up with an
insulting response. The competition is frequently harmless and good natured. Subjects
were introduced to the concept in the form of a letter from one student to another.
Authors hypothesized that African American subjects would interpret “playing the
dozens” for a harmless competition in which the winner gained peer respect, while the
Caucasian subjects would interpret the interaction as a fight.
Data supported the hypothesis, and African American subjects, significantly more
than Caucasian subjects, regarded the interaction as playful insulting, whereas Caucasian
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students interpreted the interaction as a fight. African American subjects were more
likely than Caucasian subjects to perceive students involved in the interaction as friends.
Authors suggested that cultural schemas influenced subjects’ reading comprehension.
Specifically, the information in the letter was biased in favor of the African American
students because their experiences and reactions drove their perceptions of the letter’s
content (Reynolds et al., 1982).
More recently, Calvete (2008) examined the role of cognitive variables in
adolescent antisocial behavior. The author hypothesized that cognitive schemas of
justification of the use of violence and grandiosity combined with an impulsive cognitive
style would predict antisocial behavior in adolescent subjects. In addition, the
relationship between gender and antisocial behavior was examined. The author
hypothesized that girls and boys would show an equal association between schemas and
antisocial behavior, but that boys would score higher than girls and thus exhibit higher
rates of related behavior. Subjects were 974 (457 girls and 517 boys) Spanish adolescent
students who completed measures of justification of violence, early maladaptive schema,
impulsive style, and aggressive and rule-breaking behaviors. Subjects were measured on
two occasions over a 6 month period. On the second occasion, only the measure of
delinquent behavior was administered.
Results suggested that schema regarding the justification of violence and
grandiosity predicted antisocial behavior in Spanish adolescents. Boys were shown to
have higher rates of the aforementioned schemas, which may explain higher rates of
delinquent behavior in boys. However, there was no significant difference between rates
of schema endorsement as related to aggressive behavior, which is inconsistent with the
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author’s gender hypothesis. Finally, impulsive style was not significantly correlated with
antisocial behavior, but was associated with justification of violence and grandiosity
schemas (Calvete, 2008).
Seager (2005) examined the presence of self-schemas related to violence in 50
male inmates from a minimum-security Canadian prison. Subjects’ histories of charges
and/or convictions related to assault, robbery, and fights were collected from their prison
files. They were measured via questionnaire for the presence of psychopathy and
impulsivity, and completed questions related to four vignettes to identify schemas for a
hostile world. Schemas for a hostile world were also assessed through a binocular rivalry
task in which subjects viewed two opposing images, one violent and one nonviolent,
through a stereoscope.
Results from the study showed a significant correlation between schemas for a
violent world and subject violence ratings on both verbal (vignettes) and visual (binocular
rivalry) measures. In addition, schemas for a hostile world were significantly correlated
with impulsivity. The author suggested that schemas for a violent world, past violence,
assaults, and fights were consistent predictors of violent behavior in subjects. Further
analysis revealed that impulsivity and schemas for a violent world accounted for most of
the variance in violence rating and psychopathy (Seager, 2005).
In a different study, Varela et al. (2004) sought to reveal cultural differences
among Mexican, Mexican-American, and European-American children in the reporting
of anxiety symptoms. Authors hypothesized that cultural conceptions of mental illness
would influence how children from different cultures reported anxiety symptoms.
Differences in reporting were attributed to early developed schemas learned in families of
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origin. Cultural schemas were identified as collectivism and simpatia, which are the
beliefs that (a) an individual’s self-worth is determined by people in their valued group
and (b) one should not disrupt the homeostasis of the group, even if it means making
personal sacrifices, respectively.
Authors hypothesized that Mexican and Mexican-American children would report
more anxiety symptoms than their European-American counterparts would. However,
parents of Mexican descent children would provide fewer anxiety-based interpretations
and more somatic interpretations. This discrepancy may be because somatic
interpretations are more culturally acceptable in Mexican-based cultures. The scores of
children of Mexican descent were expected to be higher on measures of simpatia and
collectivism than were the scores of European-American subjects (Varela et al., 2004).
Mexican and Mexican-American subjects identified more physiological
symptoms of anxiety than European-American subjects did. Authors suggested that this
might be the result of the influence of cultural schema on subject symptom reporting.
Mexican and Mexican-American subjects also identified more strongly with the cultural
schema of collectivism and simpatia than did European-American subjects. This stronger
identification was attributed to experiences within one’s culture and family of origin. As
hypothesized, parents of Mexican and Mexican-American children generated more
somatic and non-anxious interpretations of their children’s symptoms than EuropeanAmerican parents did. This was attributed to family interaction patterns that shaped and
reinforced cultural schema in subjects of Mexican descent (Varela et al., 2004).
Much of the empirical evidence conducted on maladaptive schemas in the literature
utilizes the Young Schema Questionnaire (Young & Brown, 2001), which is described
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later in detail. Owing to the sound psychometric properties of Young and Brown’s
schema questionnaire, the current investigation will utilize Young’s model of schematic
processing and his questionnaire to measure early maladaptive schemas. A review of
tools used to measure cognitive schemas follows.
Measures of Schemas
Most of the literature on identification of early maladaptive schemas has examined
the factor structures of the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long and Short Forms
(Young & Brown, 2001; Young & Brown, 2005), 205- and 75-question self-report
inventories, respectively, used to identify early maladaptive schemas in clinical settings.
Exploratory factor analyses in a sample of 575 students supported 15 of the original 16
factors on the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (Schmidt, et al., 1995). As
part of the same investigation, Schmidt et al. (1995) conducted a factor analysis on 187
clinical outpatients, 61% of whom were diagnosed with an Axis I disorder and 55% of
whom were diagnosed with an Axis II disorder. Results supported 15 of the original 16
early maladaptive schemas originally proposed by Young. This small sample is
noteworthy given the number of items on the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form
(Oei & Baranoff, 2007). Lee, Taylor, and Dunn (1999) resolved this discrepancy by
factor analyzing data from 433 patients working with psychologists in the Australian
health-care system. Results supported 14 of the original 16 factors proposed by Young
and established that the measure had good internal consistency and predictive validity.
The Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (2001) has been shown to predict
depression in undergraduates (Harris & Curtin, 2002; Schmidt et al., 1995). Similar
analyses of the Young Schema Questionnaire—Short Form (2005) have been conducted
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as well. Overall, findings indicate that the instrument is sound for use in clinical
populations (Welburn, Coristine, Dagg, Pontefract & Jordan, 2002), has good internal
consistency, and is predictive of eating disorders (Waller, Meyer & Vartouhi, 2001) and
depression (Glaser, Campbell, Calhoun, Bates, & Petrocelli, 2002; Welburn et al., 2002)
in clinical samples.
In addition to Young’s measures of early maladaptive schema, Beck, Freeman, et
al. (1990) developed a schema content checklist to assist in the diagnosis of Axis II
disorders. Their checklist identifies core beliefs consistent with Avoidant, Dependent,
Passive-Aggressive, Obsessive-Compulsive, Antisocial, Narcissistic, Histrionic,
Schizoid, Schizotypal, and Paranoid personality disorders. An example of beliefs
consistent with Dependent personality disorder would be, “I am needy and weak” (p.
360) and “I can’t make decisions on my own” (p. 360). These beliefs are consistent with
schemas of incompetence and helplessness that frequently characterize the thoughts of
individuals with the disorder. There are no identified psychometric data on this checklist
to date.
Measures that assess schemas can play an important role in the diagnosis and
treatment of psychological disorders with cognitive behavioral therapy. However, the
use of objective measures in clinical settings often can be costly and impractical.
Fortunately, Beck (1964) and Beck, Freeman, et al. (1990) suggested that schemas can be
identified via their cognitive content. Authors have encouraged the identification of
cognitive distortions to root out underlying core beliefs related to patient cognitive
schemas (Padesky, 1994).
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Cognitive Distortions
According to Alford and Beck (1997), cognitive schemas act to bias information
processing in a way that produces cognitive distortions. Individuals become susceptible
to specific types of cognitive distortions, which, in turn, predispose them to specific
emotional disorders. However, schemas reside at an unconscious level, which makes
defining, assessing, and measuring them difficult (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).
Beck (1995) noted that schemas are so core to one’s perception that they often
cannot be verbally articulated. The unconscious nature of schemas is a treatment
limitation in that they are not easily accessible by patients. In addition, a clinician may
need time to identify, present, and treat them, depending on the nature of the schema
itself.
Schemas can be thought to exist on a continuum from flexible to rigid. This
continuum means that some schemas may be more amenable to change than others. For
instance, continually active schemas in patients with personality disorders may be easier
than others to identify, but much harder to treat because of persistent reinforcement by
cognitions, behavior and feelings. It may take years to alter patients’ deeply imbedded
beliefs about themselves, others, and the world. Alternatively, less active schemas that
have not been as persistently reinforced may be more difficult to identify but more
amenable to change in treatment.
Schemas often can be identified and modified through patients’ more accessible
conscious cognitions (Beck, 1995). The more accessible distorted cognitions that derive
from maladaptive schemas are more amenable to treatment through cognitive behavioral
therapy. Patients can be taught to identify distorted thoughts, subject them to logic
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through testing, and correct these thoughts. New more adaptive thoughts can be
generated to replace distorted ones. This change can occur with schemas; however, as
mentioned before, this process often takes more time because of the level of
reinforcement over time that has helped imbed the schemas. Thus, both core beliefs and
cognitive distortions are treated similarly, though cognitive distortions respond better in
the short-term as a result of greater accessibility and less persistent reinforcement over
time, while schemas typically persist more strongly and take longer to alter. The more
accessible distorted thinking that drives emotional disorders is an obvious starting point
for clinicians and their patients in working from a cognitive behavioral therapy modality.
Because they are partly perpetuated by cognitions that are accessible, schemas can
often be reliably identified and modified through cognitive content (Young et al., 2003).
Through his observations of depressed patients, Beck (1964) reported that the content of
schemas could be identified through “chronic misconceptions, distorted attitudes, invalid
premises, and unrealistic goals and expectations” (p. 563). Over the past 5 decades, Beck
and colleagues have studied and developed the theory, assessment, and treatment of the
cognitive distortions. One of cognitive theory’s major contributions to the field of
psychology has been its emphasis on the mediating effect of this “idiosyncratic thought
content indicative of distorted or unrealistic conceptualizations” in psychological
dysfunction (Beck, 1963, p. 36).
Definitions of Cognitive Distortions
Beck (1967) viewed cognitive distortions as the result of faulty information
processing that produced predictable, identifiable errors in thinking. Haaga, Ernst, and
Dyck et al. (1991) defined a cognitive distortion as “a judgment or conclusion that
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disagrees or is inconsistent with some commonly accepted measure of objective reality
(p. 178).” Similarly, other authors defined cognitive distortions as “inaccurate ways of
attending to or conferring meaning on experience” (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, &
Gibbs, 2000). Freeman, et al. (2004) identified cognitive distortions as errors in logic
that lead individuals to erroneous conclusions. Beck (1995) defined cognitive distortions
as consistent errors in thinking that stem from a systematic bias in information
processing. Since Beck’s original work in the role of thinking in depression, a number of
cognitive distortions have been identified.
Types of Cognitive Distortions
Beck (1967) originally identified the following six distortions:
1. Jumping to Conclusions (also referred to as Arbitrary Inference)—interpreting
situations, events, or experiences without supporting evidence or in the face of
disconfirming evidence (Beck, 1963, p. 40).
2. Selective Abstraction (also referred to as Mental Filter)—attentional resources are
focused on one detail of a situation while other possibly more plausible
explanations and details are ignored (Burns, 1999, p. 8; Freeman et al., 2004, p.
5).
3. Overgeneralization—negative events are viewed as blanket generalizations, rather
than as isolated or infrequently occurring (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
4. Magnification (also referred to as Catastrophizing) and Minimization—gross
errors in evaluation in which negative events are seen as catastrophic and
unbearable or positive events are treated as real, but insignificant, respectively
(Beck, 1963, p. 41; Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
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5. Personalization—assuming one is the cause of a particular external event when
other factors are responsible (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
6. Absolutistic, Dichotomous Thinking (also referred to as All-or-Nothing
Thinking)—thoughts are seen in terms of mutually exclusive categories with no
“shades of gray” in between (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
Since Beck’s identification of the aforementioned distortions, authors have identified
others. The following is a list of other notable cognitive distortions:
7. “Should” Statements—the use of “should” and “have to” statements to provide
motivation to control behavior (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
8. Labeling—globally labeling oneself, rather than specific situations or behaviors
(Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
9. Emotional Reasoning—decision-making based on emotional reactions, rather than
logic. If one feels a certain way, then the feeling must reflect the true nature of
the situation (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
10. Fortune-Telling—negative expectations about future events that have not
occurred are considered to be fact (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
11. Mind Reading—the assumption that others think or act negatively without having
supporting evidence to verify it (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).
12. Externalization of Self-Worth—self-worth is based on external, rather than
internal, factors (e.g., what others think of me; Freeman & Oster, 1999; Freeman
& DeWolf, 1992).
13. Comparison—comparing oneself negatively to others in a way that concludes one
is inferior to others (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1999).
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14. Perfectionism—believing one must attain unattainable standards of perfection
without reviewing evidence for reasonableness of these standards (Freeman &
DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1999).
15. Change Fallacy—the belief that one can change what others think or how they
behave. Often one’s happiness is contingent on others changing (Gilson &
Freeman, 1999).
16. Fairness Fallacy—the belief that the world should be a fair place (Gilson &
Freeman, 1999).
17. Ignoring Fallacy—the belief that ignoring or avoiding problems will make them
disappear (Gilson & Freeman, 1999).
18. “Being Right” Fallacy—the belief that being wrong is catastrophic and that one
must constantly prove one’s thoughts and actions are correct (Gilson & Freeman,
1999).
19. Attachment Fallacy—the belief that being in an intimate relationship will solve
other, unrelated problems (Gilson & Freeman, 1999).
20. Control Fallacy—the belief that one is controlled by either external or internal
factors. External control results in the belief that one is powerless to control
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, while internal control creates beliefs of
unrealistic responsibility for external events (Gilson & Freeman, 1999).
21. Heaven’s Reward Fallacy—the belief that if one does everything perfectly, they
will be rewarded. Anger and disappointment result when the reward does not
come (Gilson & Freeman, 1999).
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22. Worrying Fallacy—the belief that worrying has a magical quality that can prevent
negative circumstances (Gilson & Freeman, 1999).
23. Blame—belief that others are responsible for one’s problems. This distortion
prevents individuals from recognizing their own role in their problems (Burns,
1999, p. 11).
24. Probability Thought-Action-Fusion—an intrusive thought increases the
probability that a negative event will occur (Rachman & Shafran, 1999).
25. Morality Thought-Action-Fusion—experiencing an intrusive thought is
considered the equivalent to executing the prohibited act (Rachman & Shafran,
1999).
This list of cognitive distortions, though not exhaustive, outlines many common
errors in thinking. Note that some degree of cognitive distortion is normal in human
beings, but individuals with emotional disorders show a greater degree of distorted
thinking that is more pervasive (Beck, 1964; Rosenfield, 2004).
Theories of Cognitive Distortions
There are a number of theories outlining how cognitive distortions develop. In
line with cognitive theories of emotional disorders (see Alford & Beck, 1997 and
Bandura, 1989), Kendall (1992) attempted to outline cognitive processing as it occurs in
human beings. He proposed that human cognitive processing involves four distinct
features, which are (a) cognitive content, (b) cognitive process, (c) cognitive structures,
and (d) cognitive products.
Kendall (1992) defined cognitive content as an individual’s internal self-talk that
is stored and organized in memory. Cognitive process refers to the functional system that
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allows cognitive processing to occur. For instance, processing of cognitive material
involves memory, attentional, encoding, and retrieval functions. Kendall referred to
cognitive structures as schemas, or the templates through which information is organized
and stored in long-term memory. Finally, cognitive products are referred to as the result
of the reciprocal action of content, process, and structure. The way in which information
is filtered and organized in these structures drives other aspects of cognition, such as
distorted thinking, which resides more inside of awareness. These distorted thoughts are
implicated in triggering a variety of emotions and behavior. Often, identifying and
challenging the cognitions inside a person’s awareness is the goal of cognitive therapy
(Beck, 1995).
Gilbert (1998) suggested an evolutionary explanation for cognitive distortions.
Rather than defects in information processing, he argued that distorted thinking is an
adaptive process, the result of millions of years of quick decision-making in threatening
situations. Distorted thinking occurs naturally when one makes decisions with heuristics
and is part of the natural make-up of the human brain. For instance, he suggested that
Absolutistic, Dichotomous Thinking (also see All-or-Nothing Thinking; i.e., experiences
are seen in terms of mutually exclusive categories with no “shades of gray” in between)
served the purpose of reducing reaction time, which in turn reduced the amount of time
one stayed in a threatening situation. Emotional Reasoning and Jumping to Conclusions
serve similar functions of protecting individuals from exposure to threat by expediting
decision-making.
In their development of the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), Yurica and
DiTomasso (2002) considered a number of developmental theories of distorted thinking.
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Developmental theories of cognitive distortions utilize long-standing theories of
development (i.e., see Freud’s Psychosexual, Erikson’s Psychosocial, Piaget’s Cognitive
Development, or Super’s Career Self-Concept). Healthy development is viewed as the
successful achievement of specific physical, emotional and psychological milestones
from birth to death.
Layden et al. (1993) utilized Erikson’s Psychosocial stages as a way to explain
how cognitive schemas and thus, cognitive distortions develop in Borderline Personality
Disorder. They suggested that Erikson’s Psychosocial stages (i.e., Trust vs. Mistrust,
Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt, Initiative vs. Guilt and Industry vs. Inferiority) serve as
developmental markers for cognitive schemas. Individuals with healthy personalities are
theorized to develop schemas consistent with the positive development of trust in others
(i.e., Trust), confident mastery of one’s environment (i.e., Autonomy), one’s own identity
(i.e., Initiative), and a sense of self-worth through one’s skills (i.e., Industry).
Alternatively, individuals who suffer mistreatment, trauma, and uncertainty develop
maladaptive schemas. Cognitive distortions develop as the child moves through Piaget’s
cognitive stages of development (i.e., sensory-motor, preoperational, concrete
operational, and formal operational). Early maladaptive schemas prime the child to
develop different distortions at different stages as they interact with the environment.
The synthesis of developmental and cognitive theories results in an explanation
by which early experiences with caregivers shape children’s core beliefs about
themselves, others, and the world, which, in turn, interacts with developing cognitive
processes, resulting in distorted thinking. For instance, in Borderline Personality
Disorder, early maltreatment, inconsistency, and exposure to trauma may result in a
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schema consistent with a lack of trust in others. During this time, childrens’ cognitive
development reflects using the senses to learn about themselves and the environment.
Maladaptive schema set the stage for the child to develop a host of negative
psychological characteristics, including a lack of object permanence. Layden et al.
(1993) hypothesized that the cognitive distortion, Mind Reading, or the assumption that
others think or act negatively without having supporting evidence to verify it, develops
during this period. This distortion may explain the proclivity of a patient with Borderline
Personality Disorder to misperceive the actions of others as negative.
Empirical Support for Cognitive Distortions
Cognitive distortions have been studied in a number of populations, including
adult sexual offenders, children and adolescents, medical patients, and those with
addictions. In addition, cognitive distortions have been identified in both internalizing
disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety) and externalizing disorders (e.g., Conduct Disorder).
Research has continually suggested the important role that cognitions play in emotional
disorders, and a number of studies will be examined below to support this point.
In his influential work, Beck (1963) identified thematic content in patient
cognitions that was congruent with specific emotional dysfunction. In particular,
cognitive themes of personal deficiency (e.g., low self-esteem and self-blame)
characterized individuals with depression. Depressed individuals tended to react to
external situations in an “irrelevant and inappropriate” (p. 38) manner and exhibited
frequent negative self-evaluations even when presented with evidence to the contrary.
Similarly, anxious patients could be distinguished from depressed patients by identifying
cognitions with themes of personal danger or threat.
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More recently, Rosenfield (2004) demonstrated that individuals who scored
clinically significant for an Axis I or II disorder on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory-III (MCMI-III) reported higher frequencies of cognitive distortions than did
those free of clinically significant emotional disorders. Therefore, the greater the number
of diagnosable conditions, the greater the degree of distorted thinking an individual
exhibited. In addition, the presence of cognitive distortions successfully predicted the
severity of Axis I and II disorders. That is, the more cognitive distortions identified, the
more severe an individual’s level of pathology.
Abel et al. (1989) examined sexual offenders and used the Cognition Scale, a 29item scale that measures distorted beliefs common among child molesters, to successfully
differentiate child molesters from the general population based on distorted thinking.
Furthermore, there was a positive relationship between the number of distortions
endorsed and the amount of time engaged in deviant behavior. This relationship
suggested that child molesters appear to maintain a number of distorted beliefs that serve
to justify, rationalize, and maintain deviant sexual behavior. Authors suggested that
successful treatment of sexual molesters include cognitive restructuring.
Other authors have found similar results. Bumby (1996) examined cognitive
distortions in 89 incarcerated men who were placed into one of three treatment groups,
which were (a) child sexual molester, (b) rapist (i.e., of women) and (c) nonsexual
offending inmate control. Results showed that subjects in the child molester group held
significantly more distorted beliefs about sexual behavior. Again, authors identified
treatment of cognitive distortions a “vital prerequisite” (p. 480) in the programming and
treatment of sexual offenders.
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A similar study conducted by Blumenthal et al. (1999) examined blame
attribution in sex offenders against adults and children. Subjects were 66 inmates who
had committed sexual offenses against children (SOC) or adults (SOA). Researchers
sought to examine whether the type of distortion was related to the nature of the offense,
whether blame attribution would differ between the treatment groups and whether a
relationship existed between specific distortions and blame attribution. Results indicated
that subject responses were valid; however, subjects in the SOC group showed higher
positive impression management than did the SOA group. SOA subjects endorsed more
external blame (e.g., society, victim) than did SOC subjects. This type of blame is in
contrast to Stermac and Segal’s (1989) finding that child molesters viewed their victim as
more responsible than did rapists and controls. Again, authors highlighted the clear role
that distorted cognitions, as well as blame attribution, play in sexually deviant behavior
(Blumenthal et al., 1999). Note that blame attribution should be considered a product of
cognitive processes and a distortion in itself (Burns, 1999). The literature on sexual
offenses clearly supports the role of cognitions in justifying, planning, carrying out,
rationalizing, and perpetuating deviant sexual behavior (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, &
Marshall, 1997).
In addition to sexual offenders, the psychological literature has identified the
presence of cognitive distortions in other populations, one of which is children and
adolescents. Mobini, Pearce, Grant, Mills and Yeomans (2006) hypothesized that
cognitive distortions mediate “behavioral undercontrol, emotional dysregulation and
executive cognitive capacity” (p. 125), what these authors referred to as neurobehavior
disinhibition. Specifically, the authors examined the aforementioned relationship as it
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related to substance use in adolescence and adulthood. They assessed affect regulation,
behavior undercontrol, executive cognitive functioning, distorted thinking, and drug and
alcohol use in subjects from childhood through adolescence. Parents were also assessed
for antisocial behavior and substance use. Results suggested that cognitive distortions
mediated neurobehavior disinhibition in late childhood, as well as the frequency of
cannabis use in midadolescence. Distorted thinking predicted prerequisite behaviors for
substance use disorder (e.g., impulsivity). The results here are consistent with Alford and
Beck’s (1997) notion that information processing interacts with cognition to affect
systems of behavior, emotion, attention, and memory.
Other authors have found similar results with adolescent populations. Barriga et
al. (2000) examined the relationship between cognitive distortions and problem behaviors
in adolescents. The authors hypothesized that 96 incarcerated male (n = 46) and female
(n = 50) adolescents, aged 13 to 19 years, would score higher on distortions categorized
as self-debasing (i.e., Catastrophizing, Overgeneralization, Personalization and Selective
Abstraction) or self-serving (i.e., Self-Centered, Blaming Others,
Minimizing/Mislabeling, Assuming the Worst) than would a group of 66 public-highschool students. Additionally, self-debasing distortions would be more strongly related
to internalizing behavior and self-serving distortions to externalizing behavior. Results
suggested that self-serving and self-debasing cognitive distortions were more prevalent
among incarcerated versus nonincarcerated high-school adolescents. Furthermore, the
evidence suggested possible differences in information processing as it related to
internalizing and externalizing problems. Specifically, self-serving cognitive distortions
were associated with externalizing behaviors, while self-debasing distortions were
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associated with internalizing behaviors. As in other studies of cognitive distortions,
cognitive distortions in Barriga et al.’s study appear a significant factor in youth
psychopathology.
Other authors have found evidence of cognitive distortions in internalizing
disorders as well. Kendall, Stark, and Adam (1990) conducted three studies that
examined the role of cognitive deficits (i.e., deficit in active information processing,
which is the inability to process information efficiently) and cognitive distortions (i.e.,
distorted processing that may be corrected) in childhood depression. Past studies (see
Kendall & Braswell, 1985) suggested that mixed findings may have been the result of
variations in methodology. In Study 1, subjects were 47 sixth-grade children who were
assessed for information-processing deficits, self-evaluative cognitive distortions, and
depression. Study 2 was conducted to replicate the results of Study 1 with a younger
population of children (n = 38 children). Study 3 was conducted to further evaluate the
nature of the subjects’ distorted thinking by having subjects’ homeroom teachers assess
subjects’ self-evaluative cognitive distortions. Results from all three studies suggested
that children’s depression was related to a negative self-evaluation, rather than to a deficit
in active information processing, concluding that the most efficacious treatment of
childhood depression would involve teaching children skills to identify and replace
maladaptive, distorted cognitions.
In addition to the body of literature on children’s internalizing and externalizing
disorders, evidence for cognitive distortions has been identified in medical populations.
In one study, Farrell, Haines, Davies, Smith and Parton (2004) examined the role of
cognitive distortions and stress in treatment adherence in child and adolescent subjects
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diagnosed with Type I diabetes. Subjects (n = 143) aged 11-18 years were measured for
cognitive distortions, stress and adherence behavior. Results suggested a positive
relationship between cognitive distortions and stress, as well as between stress levels and
adherence behavior. Although researchers did not find a direct path between distorted
thinking and adherence behavior, data did suggest an indirect relationship.
Other authors have found similar connections between chronic medical conditions
and distorted thinking. Lefebvre (1981) examined the cognitive content of 89 subjects
with chronic low-back pain. Subjects needed to meet criteria for one of four groups,
which were (a) depressed/pain, (b) nondepressed/pain, (c) depressed/nonpain and (d)
nondepressed/nonpain. Participants were assessed for cognitive distortions, pain,
cognitive distortions specifically related to pain, and depression. Results suggested that
similar levels of general cognitive distortions were present in the depressed with and
without pain groups compared with nondepressed subjects. Authors concluded that
whether triggered by pain or not, people with depression tend to exhibit global and
pervasive cognitive distortions. This finding is in line with Beck et al.’s (1979) theory of
distorted thinking in depression. In addition, depressed/pain subjects endorsed items
more strongly than did depressed/nonpain subjects, which suggested a potential
interaction between depression and pain in these subjects and that pain may play a critical
role in the way they perceive their depression (Lefebvre, 1981). Authors went further to
suggest that content variables might be important determinants of the strength of the
cognitive distortion. Therefore, a cognitive-based therapy is justified in the treatment of
individuals with low back pain.
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Other authors have also examined the role of cognitive distortions in low back
pain. Smith, Follick, Ahern, and Adams (1986) examined the role of cognitive
distortions and disability in subjects with chronic low back pain. Subjects were 90 men
and 48 women determined by a multidisciplinary team to have chronic low-back pain
resulting from prior back injury. Authors found a correlation between measures of
cognitive distortions and disability scores. The distortion of Overgeneralization was
particularly strongly related to disability. Authors suggested that this distortion may
serve to exacerbate individuals’ perceptions of disability as they relate to different areas
of their lives. That is, patients may overgeneralize true behavioral deficits in one area
(e.g., can no longer work in construction because of severe back pain) to behaviors in
other areas that are not affected by their disability (e.g., belief that they cannot ever work
in any capacity). In this sense, the distortion serves to reinforce and maintain the
person’s disability status.
Smith, Christensen, Peck, and Ward (1994) examined the relationship among
cognitive distortions, helplessness, and depression in 92 subjects diagnosed with
rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Results indicated that pain-related and general cognitive
distortions and helplessness were significantly correlated with depressed mood.
Moreover, the initial presence of cognitive distortions and perceived helplessness
predicted increased levels of depression at 4-year follow-up in subjects diagnosed with
RA. Patients in the group with RA who initially endorsed the distortions of
Overgeneralization, Selective Abstraction, Personalization and Catastrophizing were at
higher risk for developing depression at 4-year follow-up.
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In addition to their role in populations with chronic pain, cognitive distortions
have been implicated in the decision-making processes of problem gamblers. Toneatto,
Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, and Tsanos (1997) conducted qualitative analysis
to identify regular gamblers’ beliefs about increasing probability outcomes. Subjects
were 38 regular gamblers (i.e., 100 dollars monthly or one time a week) who were
recruited through a newspaper advertisement. Subjects were interviewed in an openended format about their attitudes and beliefs regarding gambling habits, and all
interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. Authors identified 13 cognitive distortions
that fell under cognitive distortion categories related to predicting outcomes, reframing
the meaning of outcomes, and engaging in behaviors that influence chance outcomes.
Authors also added two categories, which related to aligning with variables affecting
outcomes (i.e., superstitions) and making statistical judgments. Inter-rater reliability was
75% for identifying distortions, and 25% discrepancy was resolved by consensus.
Subjects were also given the opportunity to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen
(SOGS) at the end of their interview. Despite the methodological limitations of this
study (i.e., sample size, subject selection, nonexperimental, unstructured interviewing),
authors’ findings were consistent with prior studies with students and social gamblers
(see Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Griffiths, 1994). Particularly, a significant proportion
of subjects made active attempts to influence the outcomes of their gambling through
superstitious thinking and behaviors, the development of systems, or exaggerated selfconfidence. Cognitive distortions were significantly more prominent in subjects who had
a family history of problem gambling. Lastly, scores in the significant range on the
SOGS were positively correlated to having more cognitive distortions. Overall, data
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suggest a significant cognitive component in adult problem gamblers; however, more
research is needed to confirm this notion (Toneatto et al., 1997).
Freeman et al. (2004) identified a number of cognitive distortions in anxiety
disorders. Conceptualized through Beck’s cognitive theory of psychopathology, the
thinking of individuals with anxiety disorders is characterized by themes of threat and
danger. The distortions of Catastrophizing, Selective Abstraction, Overgeneralization,
Magnification/Minimization and Arbitrary Inference are common. Anxious individuals
tend to believe that worrying and rumination are effective responses to perceived possible
danger or threat, that perfectionism minimizes threat or danger, and that avoiding is
easier than facing life’s difficulties (Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984).
Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill, and Sloan (1986) also found different
cognitive distortions predictive of different anxiety disorders. The data on cognitive
distortions in emotional disorders are clear and pervasive throughout the literature.
Currently, there is evidence of cognitive distortions across disorders and populations,
including internalizing (i.e., anxiety and depressive disorders) and externalizing disorders
(i.e., conduct and behavior disorders); adults, children, and adolescents; populations with
chronic pain; problem gamblers; and sex offenders. Cognitive distortions likely will
continue to be implicated in emotional disorders as new measures are developed (Yurica
& DiTomasso, 2002). The following section reviews a number of current measures of
cognitive distortions.
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Measures of Cognitive Distortions
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD)
The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002) is a 69-item self-report scale that measures
the frequency of an individual’s systematic errors in logical thinking, or cognitive
distortions. Items consist of short sentences that reflect types of distorted thinking.
Individual responses are chosen from a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Often, Always), and response values range from 1 = Never to 5 = Always.
The range of possible scores on the ICD is from 69 to 345. Higher scores indicate higher
frequencies of distorted thinking, while lower scores indicate lower frequencies.
Regarding the instrument’s reliability and validity, the ICD has shown
satisfactory construct validity. Factor analysis revealed 11 factors that closely resembled
10 theory-derived cognitive distortion subscales (i.e., Externalization of Self-Worth,
Fortune-Telling, Magnification, Labeling, Perfectionism, Comparison to Others,
Emotional Reasoning, Arbitrary Inference/Jumping to Conclusion, Minimization, and
Mind-Reading), in addition to one nontheory-derived cognitive distortion subscale, which
was labeled Emotional Reasoning/Decision Making (Yurica, 2002). Content validity was
determined by a panel of three cognitive therapy experts, all of whom agreed
unequivocally on the validity of the original 69 items. Test-retest reliability indicated
very strong consistency over time, with total scores of .998 (n = 28, p < .0001).
Concurrent validity was good, and the ICD was significantly correlated with
measures of negative thinking, depression, and anxiety, which will be explained briefly
later. The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) was designed to measure a depressed
person’s negative attitudes toward self, world, and others. Items on the ICD were shown
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to be positively and significantly correlated to negative attitudes (r = .70, n = 159, p <
.0001). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
are measures of depression and anxiety symptoms, respectively. The ICD was positively
and significantly correlated with both of these instruments (r = .70, n = 161, p < .0001; r
= .59, n = 161, p < .0001, respectively; Yurica, 2002).
Yurica (2002) also found the ICD to have strong criterion validity. Her sample
consisted of clinical (n = 122) and non-clinical (n = 66) participants, and the ICD was
able to significantly distinguish between the two groups (F = 15.2, df = 169, p < .0001).
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS)
The DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978) is a 40-item self-report designed to measure
the dysfunctional thinking of depressed individuals. Items are single-sentence statements
that are answered on a 7-point Likert scale. The instrument provides a global score with
a possible range from 40 to 280, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of
dysfunctional thinking. Yurica (2002) reported good internal consistency with alphas
ranging from .84 - .92, good test-retest correlations from .80 - .84, and excellent
concurrent validity. In addition, the DAS has been correlated with other measures of
depression and dysfunctional thinking and has been used widely in psychological
research to measure dysfunctional attitudes in depression.
Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CEQ)
The CEQ (Lefebvre, 1981) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire developed to
measure cognitive errors. The scale measures four prominent cognitive distortions in the
psychological literature, which are Catastrophizing, Overgeneralization, Personalization,
and Selective Abstraction. CEQ items are comprised of short vignettes of ordinary

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS

45

situations in a variety of contexts that are followed by a cognition that embodies a
common cognitive distortion. Using a 5-point scale, subjects are asked to rate how
closely their own thinking would reflect the given distorted statement.
Test-retest reliability (.80 - .85), alternative-forms reliability (.76 - .82) and
internal consistency (.89 - .92) are high. Regarding concurrent validity, the measure has
been moderately correlated with the Hammen and Krantz (1976) Depressed-Distorted
Scale (.53 - .60).
Low Back Pain Cognitive Error Questionnaire (LBP-CEQ)
The LBP-CEQ (Lefebvre, 1981) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire developed
to measure cognitive errors in subjects with low back pain. The scale measures four
prominent cognitive distortions in the psychological literature, which are Catastrophizing,
Overgeneralization, Personalization and Selective Abstraction. CEQ items are comprised
of short vignettes of ordinary situations in a variety of contexts that are followed by a
cognition that embodies a common cognitive distortion. However, unlike the CEQ, the
LBP-CEQ’s items focus on situations related to “a problem, personal limitation or
interpretation related to an individual with a back disorder” (p. 518). Using a 5-point
scale, subjects are asked to rate how closely their own thinking would reflect the given
distorted statement.
LBP-CEQ test-retest reliability (.80 - .85), alternative-forms reliability (.76 - .82)
and internal consistency (.89 - .92) are reported high. Like the CEQ, the LBP-CEQ has
been moderately correlated with the Hammen and Krantz (1976) Depressed-Distorted
Scale (.53 - .60).
Cognitive Distortion Scale (CDS)
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The CDS (Najavits, 1993) is a 12-item measure designed to identify common
cognitive distortions in individuals with dual diagnoses of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and a substance use disorder (SUD). Items are scaled on a subjective units of
distress scale (SUDS) from 0 (not at all) to 100 (all the time).
The CDS measures 12 distortions which are (a) The Escape, (b) Beating Yourself
Up, (c) Dangerous Permission, (d) Time Warp, (e) Short-Term Thinking, (f) Fooling
Yourself, (g) Confusing Needs and Wants, (h) The Good Old Days, (i) Overreacting, (j)
Deprivation Reasoning, (k) Instant Satisfaction and (l) Rose Colored Glasses (Najavits,
Gotthardt, Weiss, & Epstein, 2004).
Intercorrelations between CDS items suggest low convergent validity (range, .03
– .51). Internal consistency of the measure was high, with an alpha of .93. A principal
components analysis identified a three-factor solution, which were cognitive
rationalization, affective conflict, and time distortion and represented 60% of total
variance. The CDS successfully differentiated a dual-diagnosis group (PTSD/SUD) from
a single diagnosis group (PTSD only) of 92 adult female subjects. Overall, the
psychometrics of the CDS suggest that this measure is adequate for distinguishing female
patients with dual diagnosis PTSD and SUD from female patients with PTSD only, as
well as for distinguishing common cognitive distortions among these individuals
(Najavits et al., 2004).
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATS and ATS-R)
The ATS (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 30-item self-report designed to measure
the cognitive self-statements of depressed adults and children (Kazdin, 1990). Items are
scored on a scale from “not at all” to “all the time,” and total scores are the sum of all 30
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items. Yurica (2002) noted the ATS has been correlated with the BDI-II, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Depression Scale, and the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI) A-Trait Scale. The ATS has been used with clinical populations and
successfully distinguished between depressed and non-depressed subjects. The ATS has
shown moderate to high construct validity (r’s from .45 - .87).
The Abel and Becker Cognition Scale (ABCS)
The ABCS (Abel et al., 1989) is a 29-item self-report designed to measure the
cognitive distortions of child molesters. Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale with
lower scores indicating greater distortion. The ABCS was found to have acceptable to
good internal consistency, with alphas ranging from .59 - .82. Test-retest reliability was
examined and determined to be acceptable for the six individual factors (correlations
from .59 - .82), as well as for the entire scale (correlation of .76). Data suggested that the
ABCS was able to discriminate child molesters from the general population and that the
number of years engaged in molesting behavior was positively correlated to the number
of distortions endorsed. Overall, authors concluded that the scale was an accurate
measure of cognitive distortions in child molesters.
Note that authors indicated the ABCS to be “transparent” (p. 140), and no
attempts were made to disguise the nature or purpose of the instrument during
development. Other authors (see Blumenthal et al., 1999) have raised concern over
response bias via positive impression management. Other authors have found similar
results (see Langevin, 1991).
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Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB)
The SPB (Demaria, Kassinove & Dill, 1989) is a 50-item self-report grounded in
rational emotive theory (Ellis, 1958) that measures cognitive distortions. Items are
scored on a 6-point Likert scale, with lower scores indicating greater distortion.
Confirmitory factor analysis of the SPB identified five factors, which were Awfulizing,
Low Frustration Tolerance, Self-Directed Dictatorial Shoulds, Other-Directed Shoulds,
and Self-Worth (alphas ranged from .57 - .72). Limited support was found for the SPB’s
ability to discriminate anxiety and depression in a sample of college students. Only three
of the five scales (i.e., Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance, and SelfWorth) were significantly correlated with measures of psychological symptoms. OtherDirected Shoulds was negatively correlated with anxiety symptoms, that is, greater
distortion was associated with less anxiety (Chang & D’Zurilla, 1996). These results are
in contrast to Nottingham (1992), who found moderate correlations between the SPB and
measures of depression and anxiety in an inpatient population, which suggests possible
sampling bias.
Steel, Moller, Cardenas, and Smith (2006) compared South African, Mexican, and
American college student samples in order to examine the cross-cultural reliability of the
SPB. Results indicated a significant effect for culture, which authors suggested could
reflect real differences in distorted thinking across cultures or insufficient cross-cultural
reliability of the SPB.
Overall, the psychometric research of the SPB suggests problems with validity
and reliability, which raises questions about its effectiveness in clinical settings. Thus,
further research is warranted on the SPB.
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Molest Scale/Rape Scale
The 38-item Molest and 36-item Rape Scales (Bumby, 1996) are both self-report
measures of cognitive distortions of child molesters and rapists, respectively. Items are
answered via a 4-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from “strongly agree” to
“strongly disagree.” Responses on both scales are summed to provide a total score, with
higher scores indicating higher levels of distorted thinking. The Molest and Rape Scales
measure cognitive distortions related to Justification, Minimization, Rationalization and
Excuses commonly used by individuals who molest children or sexually assault women.
The Molest Scale showed excellent internal consistency (alpha of .97) and good
test-retest reliability (r = .84; p < .001) over a 2-week interval. The Molest Scale was
positively correlated with other measures of cognitive distortions of sex offenders,
including the Cognitive Distortion/Immaturity Subscale of the Multiphasic Sex Inventory
(MSI) and the ABCS. The Molest Scale also correlated with the Lie Scale on the MSI.
The Molest Scale showed the ability to discriminate between incarcerated child
molesters, rapists, and nonsexual offender controls.
The Molest Scale was not significantly correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale, which suggests that the measure is free from a social
desirability response bias (i.e., exaggerating socially acceptable behavior and minimizing
behaviors that conflict with social norms).
The psychometrics of the Rape Scale were also measured. Authors found that the
measure showed excellent internal consistency (alpha of .96) and good test-retest
reliability (r = .86; p < .001) over a 2-week interval. The measure was significantly
correlated with other measures of cognitive distortions of sex offenders, including the
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Cognitive Distortion/Immaturity Subscale of the MSI, which indicates the construct and
convergent validity of the instrument.
Like the Molest Scale, the Rape Scale was found to be is free from a social
desirability response bias. The instrument successfully discriminated rapists from
incarcerated child molesters and nonsexual offender controls.
Authors also used the measures in the context of sexual offender treatment that
included a cognitive restructuring element. Results indicated a decrease in the cognitive
distortions of both rapists and child molesters over two 3-month intervals. This decrease
suggests the efficacy of these scales in clinical settings that address sexual offender
treatment.
Negative Cognitive Errors in Children Questionnaire (CNCEQ)
The CNCEQ (Leitenberg et al., 1986) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire
designed to measure Beck’s (1967) original cognitive distortions in children. The
measure is modeled after Lefebvre’s (1981) Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire in
that it utilizes vignettes related to different contexts (e.g., social, athletic, academic). The
measure examines the distortions of Catastrophizing, Overgeneralizing, Personalization,,
and Selective Abstraction. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at
all like I would think” to “almost exactly like I would think.” A total cognitive distortion
score is arrived at by computing the total endorsements. The measure has a possible
range of scores from 24 to 120, with higher scores indicating higher numbers of
distortions.
Preliminary psychometric data suggested test-retest reliability to be adequate, but
low (r = .65; p < .001; Leitenberg, et al., 1986). Internal consistency of the CNCEQ was
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found to be adequate to good, with alphas ranging from .60-.82 for the subscales and .89
for the full scale in a sample of normal children (Robins & Hinkley, 1989). In a sample
of fourth- to eighth-grade children, low self-esteem, depression, and evaluative anxiety
were correlated with the CNCEQ’s total score and the distortion of Overgeneralization
(Leitenberg et al., 1986).
How I Think Questionnaire (HIT)
The HIT (Gibbs, Barriga, & Potter, 2001) is a 63-item self-report instrument used
to measure cognitive distortions of 13- to 20-year-olds who exhibit one of four categories
of antisocial behaviors, which are (a) stealing, (b) lying, (c) physical aggression, and (d)
disrespect for rules, laws, and authority. Of the 63 items, 43 represent self-serving
distortions (e.g., if someone is careless enough to lose his or her wallet, he or she
deserves to have it stolen) and 20 are control items. Twelve of the 20 control items are
designed to determine potential impression management via inconsistent or unlikely
responses, while the additional eight are items related to prosocial behavior to
camouflage the distortion items. Items are scored on a 6-point Likert scale that ranges
from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” (Barriga et al., 2000).
Initial psychometric data of the HIT indicated high test-retest reliability (r = .91; p
< .001), suggesting that the measure performed similarly with respondents at different
periods in time. Internal consistency for the HIT measure was high (alphas ranging from
.93- .96; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996).
The HIT correlated with the Externalizing Scale of the Youth Self-Report Form (r
= .55; p < .001) and the Nye-Short Self-Reported Delinquency Questionnaire (r = .36; p
< .0001), which suggested that the measure has adequate construct validity. In addition,
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correlations between the cognitive distortion subscales and antisocial behavior on the
aforementioned scales was significant (r’s ranged from .23-.55). Cognitive distortions
correlated highly with the overall HIT (r’s ranged from .87-.92; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996).
The HIT was only partially successful at discriminating among criterion groups,
which were (a) 55 incarcerated male adolescent delinquents, (b) 50 male adolescents
from an urban working-class high-school in Grades 10 through 12, and (c) 42 male
adolescents in Grades 10 to 12 from a suburban upper-middle-class public high school.
This partial success is concerning for the measure considering that the incarcerated group
was adjudicated for felonies including robbery, rape, and murder. To the measure’s
defense, the Blaming Others subscale did successfully discriminate group (a) from groups
(b) and (c). However, group (b), like group (c), reported low levels of delinquent
behavior, but group (b) reported distortions equal to those of group (a). Authors
explained this discrepancy through potential group differences owing to impression
management (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). Other studies have shown that the HIT effectively
discriminated court-referred and hospitalized externalizing adolescents from urban highschool students (Barriga et al., 2000).
Bulimia Cognitive Distortions Scale (BCDS)
The BCDS (Schulman, Kinder, Powers, Prange, & Gleghorn, 1986) is a 25-item,
self-report measure of cognitive distortions characteristic of individuals with bulimia
nervosa. Items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.” A total score is obtained by adding the responses to each of the 25
items, with a possible range of scores from 25 to 125, with higher scores indicating
higher levels of distorted thinking.
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Internal consistency between BCDS items was good, with 16 of the 25 items
correlating .75 or better and no correlation lower than .60. The measure had a coefficient
alpha of .97 in further support of its good internal consistency (Schulman et al., 1986).
Factor analysis revealed a two-factor solution that accounted for 100% of the
variance. Authors identified first factor as cognitive distortions related to automatic
eating behaviors (91% of total variance), while the second factor was cognitive
distortions related to physical appearance (9% of the total variance; Schulman et al.,
1986).
The BCDS correlated with the Demand for Approval (r = .63; p < .001) and High
Self-Expectations (r = .58; p < .0001) subtests of the Irrational Beliefs Test. It was also
significantly correlated with the BDI-II (r = .77; p < .0001). Contrary to expectations, the
Bizarre Sensory Experiences (BSE) subscale of the MMPI was not significantly
correlated with bulimic subjects (r = .19; Schulman et al., 1986).
The BCDS was shown to have good predictive validity and successfully
discriminated subjects with bulimia from a non-clinical college population, F (1, 108) =
262.9, p < .0001. The measure accurately predicted 100% of the nonclinical college
sample and 87.3% of the sample with bulimia. Additionally, the measure was able to
discriminate levels of severity of bulimia in subjects as measured by the frequency of
binge-eating episodes. No data on test-retest reliability for the measure were provided by
authors (Schulman et al., 1986).
Limitations of Measures of Cognitive Distortions
Yurica (2002) identified a number of limitations of measures of cognitive
distortions. First, there is a lack of consistency in definitions of various distortions. For
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instance, on the CDS, Najavits (1993) referred to “Overreacting,” while “Jumping to
Conclusions” is used on the ICD and “Catastrophizing” on the LBP-CEQ. Though these
distortions appear to be measuring the same construct (i.e., anticipating the most negative
conclusion), a lack of consistent terminology and definitions for cognitive distortions
interferes with their accurate measurement (Yurica, 2002).
A second drawback to measures of cognitive distortions is that they are often
derived from research on negative thought patterns in specific disorders and populations
rather than on the general underlying processes of distorted cognition. This adds further
confusion to the measurement of cognitive distortions. For instance, Yurica (2002)
pointed out how the DAS and CEQ were designed to assess cognitive distortions in
depression, which limits their applicability in clinical contexts. Additionally, many
measures that provide a total score, like the DAS, fail to categorize and identify specific
types of distortions that may be beneficial to psychological treatment. An exception to
this is the ICD, which does provide more standardized, specific information on
distortions present in a variety of psychological disorders.
Hopelessness
Alford & Beck’s (1997) cognitive theory espoused that cognitive schemas help
individuals make meaning of experience and generate core beliefs that drive
environmental, interpersonal, emotional, and behavioral adaptation. When cognition
interacts with schema, it aids the development of patterned emotional, attentional,
memory, and behavioral activity, which Beck referred to as “cognitive content
specificity” (p. 16). Each psychological disorder can be characterized by the cognitive
content of the individual. Psychopathology in depression is believed to result from
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maladaptive assignment of negative meaning to the self, world, and future, which are
described as the cognitive triad. The assignment of negative meaning to the future has
been characterized to represent hopelessness. Currently, two major theories to explain
hopelessness and its relationship to emotional disorders. They are cognitive theory of
depression (Beck, 2002; Beck et al., 1979) and hopelessness theory of depression
(Abramson et al., 1989). Currently, evidence associates hopelessness with mood
disorders and suicide and suggests that hopelessness should be an important focus of the
treatment of individuals in clinical settings (Beck, Brown, Berchick, Stewart, & Steer,
1990; Beck, Riskind, Brown, & Steer, 1988). Lastly, measures designed to assess
hopelessness in child and adult populations will be reviewed.
Definitions of hopelessness
Beck (2002) characterized the negative view of the future and self that is evident
in individuals with depression by both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about
the future, and (b) helplessness, or one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect
future outcomes (Henkel, Bussfeld, Moller, & Hegerl, 2002; Stotland, 1969). Abramson
et al. (1989) defined hopelessness as the “expectation that highly valued outcomes will
not occur or that highly aversive outcomes will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an
expectation that no response in one’s repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence
of these outcomes” (p. 359). Therefore, researchers generally agreed that hopelessness
consists of thoughts about both the future and whether or not the individual believes he or
she can alter future events.
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Theories of hopelessness
Beck’s theory of depression
Beck’s (Beck et al., 1979) cognitive theory of depression utilizes a cognitive
diathesis-stress model to explain the onset and maintenance of depression. Diathesisstress models explain the emergence and maintenance of psychopathology as the
interaction between stress, or negative life events, and genetic variables. Selye (1963)
viewed stress as an event that taxes an individual’s ability to adapt significantly enough
to cause changes in daily functioning. He also found that stress created identifiable and
measurable changes in the brain and body. However, though stress is considered one
variable in the onset of depression, many people who encounter life stress will not
experience symptoms of depression.
Caspi et al. (2003) identified a gene that appears to moderate the influence of
stressful events on depression, which suggests that sensitivity to life stress is contingent
on an individual’s genetic make-up. Therefore, the diathesis (i.e., genetic predisposition)
mediates an individual’s reaction to stressful events. The diathesis-stress model espouses
that individuals have a genetic predisposition that makes the development of particular
disorders more probable (diathesis), with each individual having different stress
thresholds for when a disorder might emerge (Ingram & Luxton, 2005).
In Beck’s (Beck et al., 1979) diathesis-stress model of depression, the diathesis is
cognitive. His theory espouses that depression is characterized by a negative systematic
bias in an individual’s interpretation of his or her experiences (i.e., information
processing). Beck and Clark (1988) explained the cognitive diathesis in depression with
the cognitive triad, which is characterized by themes of loss and deprivation. Cognitive
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content of individuals with depression, generated by early maladaptive schemas, focuses
on views of the self as “inadequate, deprived and worthless” (p.26), views of the world as
“presenting insurmountable obstacles” (p. 26), and views of the future as “utterly bleak
and hopeless” (p. 26). This negative view of the future and self encapsulate
hopelessness, which drives an individual’s expectation that negative events will occur
and that he or she will not be able to affect those negative outcomes, respectively (Henkel
et al., 2002).
When faced with environmental stress, a cognitive diathesis manifests in the
cognitive triad, which, in turn, gives way to symptoms of depression (e.g., sadness). In
the absence of stress, the cognitive diathesis is believed to lie dormant and is therefore
less likely to lead to depressive symptoms. The cognitive diathesis and stress are
theorized to be distal variables (i.e., at the beginning of the causal chain) in the onset of
depression. Hopelessness, or a depressed individual’s negative view of the future, is
thought to be a sufficient proximal cause (i.e., late in the causal pathway and guarantee
the expression of symptoms) of depression and is considered to have a mediating effect
on depressive symptomatology (Dixon, Heppner, Burnett, & Lips, 1993).
Haaga et al. (1991) reviewed several components of Beck’s cognitive theory of
depression: negativity, exclusivity, triad, automaticity, universality, necessity, specificity,
association with noncognitive symptoms and information processing biases or distortions.
Each component is addressed in the following list.
1. Negativity refers to the cognitive valence of the thinking of the person with
depression. Evidence has consistently shown that individuals with depression
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score higher on measures of negative thinking than do nondepressed individuals
(Haaga et al., 1991).
2. Exclusivity refers to the prediction that individuals with depression experience
only negative and neutrally valenced cognitions and no positive cognitions. Little
support for this absence of positive cognitions exists in the literature, with most
studies supporting the presence of both positive and negative thoughts (Haaga et
al., 1991).
3. The cognitive triad refers to the depressed individual’s maladaptive assignment of
negative meaning to the self, world, and future. Strong evidence shows that
subjects who are depressed think more negatively about themselves, the world,
and the future than do nondepressed subjects. Subjects with depression also
endorse more hopelessness about the future than nondepressed and remitted
subjects do (Haaga et al., 1991). Hopelessness was found to be unique to subjects
with depression, who rate negative outcomes as more likely to occur and positive
outcomes as less likely.
4. Automaticity refers to the automatic nature of information processing in
depression, and currently, not enough research has been done to suggest its role in
individuals with depression (Haaga et al., 1991).
5. Universality refers to the presence of negative view of self, world, and future
across different depressive disorders. Evidence supports the universality of the
cognitive triad in unipolar, bipolar, primary, secondary, endogenous and
nonendogenous, and melancholic and nonmelancholic depressions. Therefore,
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depression has a similar presentation regardless of the disorder (e.g., Bipolar
Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder; Haaga et al., 1991).
6. Necessity refers to all individuals with depression exhibiting the cognitive triad.
Haaga et al. (1991) highlighted hopelessness studies that suggest that subjects
who have depression do not always have a negative view of the future. The
cognitive theory of depression suggests that only one component of the triad is a
necessary condition for depression. Whether all depressed individuals experience
at least one triad component is not currently known.
7. Specificity refers to the depressive profile of negativity and loss particular to
depressive disorders. Empirical evidence is mixed on cognitive specificity in
depression. Haaga et al. (1991) indicated that in most studies, patients with
depression (a) had greater numbers of negative cognitions, (b) had more negative
self-concept, (c) used fewer positively valenced adjectives to describe themselves,
(d) were more hopeless, and (e) endorsed more negative adjectives about the
world than did psychiatric controls. Additionally, when compared with subjects
with anxiety, subjects with depression exhibited more aspects of the cognitive
triad.
8. Association with noncognitive symptoms refers to the relationship between
cognitions and emotional and behavioral symptoms of depression (e.g., fatigue,
sleep disturbance, suicidal behavior). Even when controlling for depression, the
cognitive symptom of hopelessness has been shown repeatedly to be significantly
correlated with suicidal behavior (Haaga et al., 1991).
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9. Information processing biases or distortions relates to cognitive theory’s ability to
distinguish between an information processing bias (i.e., automatic tendency to
selectively focus on the negative aspects of one’s experience) and distorted
thinking (e.g., systematic errors in thinking that derive from the information
processing bias, such as Dichotomous Thinking and Arbitrary Inference). In their
review Haaga et al. (1991) did not find sufficient data to suggest that the theory
effectively differentiated between the two constructs. Clark et al. (1999) explain
this finding by referring to the information processing bias in depression as a
cognitive shift where as a person becomes depressed, they move from encoding
environmental stimuli in a positive or neutral manner to a negative one. The
result is thinking that is characterized by systematic thinking errors or cognitive
distortions. Therefore, the bias refers to an underlying process shift or orientation
that negatively distorts one’s thoughts.
Abramson et al.’s theory of Hopelessness Depression
Hopelessness theory is similar to Beck’s theory of depression in a number of
ways. First, it is based on a cognitive diathesis-stress model, which espouses an
interaction between cognitive variables and environmental stressors. Second, it identifies
both distal and proximal causes that lead to depressive symptoms. Third, both theories
espouse a cognitive diathesis that contributes to the development of hopelessness.
Hopelessness theory diverges from cognitive theory of depression, however, in how
hopelessness and thus, hopelessness depression, is arrived at.
Abramson et al. (1989) based hopelessness theory on Abramson, Seligman, and
Teasdale’s (1978) theory of helplessness and depression. Hopelessness theory is an
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updated theory based on current research on clinical depression. The theory can be
thought of as a chain of causal events, each with differing influence on the development
of hopelessness and, thus, hopelessness depression, a hypothesized subtype of clinical
depression.
In the theory, hopelessness is described as a sufficient proximal cause of
hopelessness depression. That is, hopelessness appears at the end of the causal chain and
guarantees the development of the depression subtype. Hopelessness is arrived at
through an interaction between (a) perceived negative life events/perceived lack of
positive life events and (b) negative inferences about causes, consequences, and the self
related to the perceived negative event. In addition, authors theorized proximal
contributory causes that increase the likelihood of becoming hopeless, but they are
neither sufficient in themselves nor necessary for hopelessness to occur.
A last contributory cause, cognitive style, is thought to occur at the beginning of
the causal chain (i.e., distal) and serves as the diathesis in this model (Abramson et al.,
1989). Authors suggested that individuals with a “depressogenic attributional style”
(Abramson et al., 1989, p. 362) would be more prone to attribute negative causes to
events and tend to view negative events as very important (Alloy & Clements, 1998). An
individual’s cognitive style is the diathesis in the diathesis-stress model and is thought to
activate in the presence of perceived negative life events (i.e., stress). This cognitive
style is believed to have a negative relationship to perceived negative life events. That is,
the less negative the cognitive style, the greater the life event needed to lead to symptoms
of hopelessness and, thus, hopelessness depression (Abramson et al., 1989).
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Empirical examinations of Abramson et al.’s theory of hopelessness depression
provide partial evidence for proposed causal pathways. Discrepancies may be the results
of a number of factors, including the use of relatively healthy subjects in a number of
studies, poor generalizability of undergraduate samples, interpretation of correlation as
representing causality, and considerable overlap with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM), 4th ed., text rev. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
symptoms of major depression (in the case of hopelessness theory; Henkel et al., 2002).
With this stated, there is evidence for hopelessness depression in the
psychological literature base. For example, Alloy and Clements (1998) found that
college students with a depressive cognitive style showed significantly higher rates of
hopelessness depression symptoms (i.e., decreased motivation, sad affect, suicidal
ideation/attempts, low energy, apathy, psychomotor retardation, sleep disturbance, poor
concentration, low self-esteem, and dependency) than did student subjects without a
depressive cognitive style. Though this evidence is promising, many studies have failed
to identify hopelessness depression by its hypothesized symptom profile (Joiner et al.,
2001; Spangler, Simons, Monroe, & Thase, 1993; Whisman, Miller, Norman, & Keitner,
1995). All have found partial, but not full, support for the symptoms, which may be the
results of significant overlap in symptoms between hopelessness depression and major
depression as outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (2000).
Spangler et al. (1993) measured 57 outpatients being treated for mood disorders
for attributional style, life stress, and depressive symptoms. They hypothesized that
hopelessness would be able to be identified by the diathesis-stress component and by
Abramson et al.’s (1989) hypothesized symptom profile. Authors found that subjects
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who matched positive for depressogenic cognitive style and perceived negative life
events had higher levels of hopelessness than did subjects who did not match on
cognitive style and negative life events. However, subjects could not to be identified by
the hypothesized symptom profile for hopelessness depression.
Regarding the mediational nature of hopelessness, which both Beck’s (2002) and
Abramson et al.’s (1989) theories propose, research has shown little support. Dixon et al.
(1993) found that hopelessness moderated, not mediated, the relationship between stress
and depression symptoms. That is, hopelessness appeared to impact the strength of the
relationship between stressful situations and depressive symptoms.
Similarly, Gibb, Beevers, Andover, and Holleran (2006) examined Abramson’s
hopelessness theory (1989) and found that cognitive style moderated the relationship
between negative life events and symptoms of depression in 162 undergraduates. That is,
subjects who measured high for (a) attributing negative events to stable and global causes
and (b) inferring negative outcomes to these events showed stronger depressive
symptoms over the course of the study.
Abela (2001) found that hopelessness did not mediate the interactions between
cognitive style and perceived negative events in third-and seventh-grade samples.
Finally, Gibb, Alloy, Abramson, and Marx (2003) found evidence for partial mediation of
hopelessness in the relationship between cognitive style and hopelessness depression
symptoms in a sample of college students. This evidence suggests that hopelessness may
be a variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the aforementioned relationships
or that it may be one of a number of variables that mediate these relationships (Baron &
Kenny, 1986).
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Hopelessness and Psychopathology
According to Beck et al. (1988), hopelessness is specific to depression. Though
other authors (see Akiskal, Hirschfeld, and Yerevanian, 1983; Beck, Wenzel, Riskind,
Brown & Steer, 2006; Stotland, 1969) have argued that hopelessness may be implicated
in other disorders as well, the bulk of the research has suggested otherwise. In their
review of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, Haaga et al. (1991) found strong
evidence to support the relationship among depression, hopelessness, and suicide.
Hopelessness was found to be more highly correlated with suicide than was depression
(Minkoff et al., 1973), making hopelessness a better predictor than depression of eventual
suicide.
One study (Minkoff et al., 1973) examined 68 hospitalized suicide attempters
aged 14 to 63 years. Of the 68 subjects, more than half (n = 45) were diagnosed with a
depressive disorder, while the remainder (n = 23) were diagnosed with schizophrenia. To
be included in the sample, subjects had to have (a) shown intent to die and (b) followed
through with a suicidal act, regardless of the severity of harm caused. Subjects who had
intent but stopped short of follow-through were excluded, as were those who selfmutilated without intent to die, took accidental overdoses, and engaged in other selfinjurious behaviors. Subjects were administered the BDI to measure severity of
depression, the Suicide Intent Scale (SIS) to measure the seriousness of suicidal intent,
and the Generalized Expectancies Scale (GES) to measure level of hopelessness.
Authors found severity of depression and level of hopelessness to be significantly
positively correlated. That is, as depression severity increased, so did level of
hopelessness. Hopelessness was more highly correlated with seriousness of intent than
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with severity of depression. Regardless of subjects’ depression scores, high hopelessness
scores had higher seriousness-of-intent scores. Results were also examined according to
diagnosis. Subjects with depression showed significant correlations between severity of
depression and seriousness of intent, but level of hopelessness was still more highly
correlated with intent. Subjects with schizophrenia showed a nonsignificant correlation
between severity of depression and intent, but a significant correlation between
hopelessness and intent. Authors concluded that hopelessness was a more critical factor
in suicide than was depression (Minkoff et al., 1973).
Other studies have shown similar findings. Kuo, Gallo, and Eaton (2004) used a
longitudinal study to examine hopelessness and suicide behaviors at baseline and at 13year follow-up in 3,481 subjects. Authors hypothesized that hopelessness would be a
long-term predictor of suicidal behavior. Suicidal behavior was defined as (a) completed
suicide, (b) suicide attempts, and (c) suicidal ideation. Like previous studies, results
indicated that hopelessness was a stronger predictor of suicidal behavior than were
depression or substance abuse disorders. Hopelessness was significant for suicide
completion, attempts, and ideation and was concluded to be a significant risk for suicide.
Beck, Steer, Kovacs, and Garrison (1985) studied hopelessness in 205 subjects
hospitalized for suicidal ideation, but not for recent suicide attempts. Subjects were
selected based on whether they had “seriously thought about, planned or wished to
commit suicide” (p. 560). Subjects were assessed longitudinally at admission and at 5year follow-up. Great lengths were taken to have periodic contact with subjects, either
directly or indirectly, to assess status. Subjects were administered the BDI, Beck
Hopelessness Scale (BHS) and The Scale for Suicide Ideation.
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Authors (Beck et al., 1985) found that 14 of the participants had committed
suicide by follow-up. The BHS was the only scale that significantly distinguished suicide
completers from noncompleters. Higher scores of hopelessness (cutoff of 9) were more
highly correlated with completers (90.9% had a score of 9 or above) than with
noncompleters. Severity of depression did not significantly differentiate completers from
noncompleters, which supports similar past results (see Minkoff et al., 1973). Authors
concluded that hopelessness is a major component of suicidal behavior and that
psychological interventions for hopelessness may be effective for reducing suicidal
behaviors (Beck et al., 1985). Most notable was that the BHS showed the ability to
predict future suicide. The link between hopelessness and depression and suicidal
behavior is generally supported in the psychological literature.
Chochinov, Wilson, Enns, and Lander (1998) studied 198 subjects with advanced
terminal cancer and found that hopelessness mediated the relationship between
depression and suicidal ideation. Suicidal ideation and depression were significantly
correlated, as were suicidal ideation and hopelessness; however, suicidal ideation
correlated more highly with hopelessness than with depression. Further analyses showed
evidence that suggested that hopelessness mediates the relationship between depression
and suicidal ideation.
Kazdin, French, Unis, Esveldt-Dawson, and Sherick (1983) found that
hospitalized subjects aged 5 to 13 years with high scores on hopelessness had higher
levels of depression and lower self-esteem than those of low-scoring subjects.
Additionally, hopelessness correlated more strongly with suicidal behavior than did
depression. Greater hopelessness was significantly positively correlated with intent in
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subjects. These data suggest that, like adults, childrens’ suicidal behavior is associated
with negative beliefs about the self and the future.
Measures of Hopelessness
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS)
The BHS (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) is a 20-item, short question
scale that was developed to assess hopelessness, a central component in depression and
suicide. True-false statements indicate responses. Of the 20 items, 9 are coded false and
11 true. Responses are scored as 0 or 1, and there is a possible range of hopelessness
from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of hopelessness.
Reliability was assessed with a hospitalized psychiatric population (n = 294) and
the internal consistency of individual items was good (r = .93; Beck et al., 1974).
Durham (1982) found reliability to differ among two clinical samples and one college
student sample (r = .86, .83, and .65, respectively), suggesting acceptable reliability with
clinical populations. Other studies conducted with college samples have shown better
reliability (r = .85; Chang, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 1994). Dyce (1996) and
Young, Halper, Clark, Scheftner and Fawcett (1992) found the internal consistency to be
.92, which provided further support for the use of the BHS with clinical populations.
Currently, no studies exist of test-retest reliability with the BHS (Steed, 2001).
Concurrent validity was assessed by comparing the BHS with clinician ratings of
hopelessness gleaned during patient interviews with other instruments designed to
measure negative attitudes about the future. Two samples were compared, one of general
medical outpatients (n = 23) and the other of a psychiatric sample of individuals who had
made a recent suicide attempt (n = 62). The medical outpatient sample had a concurrent
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validity of .74 (p < .001) and the psychiatric sample of .62 (p < .001). The BHS has been
correlated with the pessimism item on the BDI and the Stuart Future Test. Correlation
with the SFT was .60 (p < .001) and with the BDI was .63 (p < .001; Beck et al., 1974).
Alford, Lester, Patel, Buchanan and Giunta (1995) showed the BHS significantly
correlated with the BDI to predict later clinical depression symptoms in college and
clinical populations. Similar correlations with depression and hopelessness were found in
the literature as well (Rholes, Riskind, & Neville, 1985). The BHS has also correlated
significantly with psychological stress measures, hopelessness items on the MMPI-2, the
Optimism and Pessimism Scale, and the pessimism subscales of the Life Orientation Test
(Steed, 2001).
Regarding the factor structure of the BHS, the original principal components
analysis revealed three factors, which were feelings about the future (41.7% of variance),
loss of motivation (6.2% of variance), and expectations about the future (5.6% of
variance; Beck et al., 1974). This analysis was replicated by Dyce (1996), who also
isolated three factors on the BHS in a sample of 411 outpatients with depression. Note
that discrepancies in the BHS factor structure have been found (e.g., Marshall, Wortman,
Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992; Ward & Thomas, 1985); however, these studies
utilized differing analyses and response formats, which raise questions regarding
generalizability of results. Furthermore, some studies utilize college samples (e.g.,
Chang et al., 1994; Durham, 1982), which limit inferences that can be made about the
data (Steed, 2001). Though the BHS has been utilized in a number of populations, data
suggest it may be most useful with clinical populations, for whom its use was originally
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intended (Durham, 1982). This utilization is possibly the result of the scale’s inability to
detect lower levels of hopelessness in nonclinical populations (Young et al., 1992).
Hopelessness Scale for Children (HSC)
The Hopelessness Scale for Children (HSC; Kazdin et al., 1983) is a 17-item,
self-report inventory used to measure hopelessness in children. True-false statements
indicate responses. The scale is modeled after the BHS (Beck et al., 1974), and questions
were reworded to be more accessible to children. Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 16 are
reverse scored, and higher scores indicate higher levels of hopelessness.
Psychometric analysis was conducted on 66 psychiatrically hospitalized children
aged 8 to 13 years. The HSC had an internal consistency of .75 (p < .001) and was
positively correlated with severity of depression on the Children’s Depression Inventory
(CDI), the Bellevue Index of Depression (BID), the Depression Symptom Checklist (DSCL), and the Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI; Kazdin et al., 1983).
Internal consistency was adequate with an alpha of .97 in a study of 262
psychiatrically hospitalized children aged 6 to 13 years. A factor analysis revealed two
factors, future expectations/giving up and happiness/future expectations, that accounted
for 78 and 22% of the variance, respectively. Test-retest reliability was .52 (p < .001),
suggesting mediocre stability over time (Kazdin, Rodgers, & Colbus, 1986).
Thurber, Hollingsworth, and Miller (1996) examined the psychometric properties
of the HSC with 201 adolescent inpatients. Authors administered the HSC to adolescents
with a variety of Axis I disorders as part of a comprehensive psychological evaluation.
Results of the analysis showed the HSC to have moderate item correlations. A factor
analysis identified two factors, motivational aspects and future happiness, which
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accounted for 29 and 8.9% of the variance, respectively. Though the factor structure is
weaker in this study than in previously mentioned studies, the identified constructs are
similar in all. Internal consistency was lower than in previous studies, with an alpha of
.81. The results suggest that the HSC may not be as psychometrically sound with the
adolescent population as with children.
Geriatric Hopelessness Scale (GHS)
The GHS (Fry, 1984) was developed to measure hopelessness among older adults.
The GHS is a 30-item, self-report measure for use with older individuals. Although the
scoring direction varies, all responses are converted to yield an overall score within a
range of 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating higher levels of hopelessness.
A factor analysis of the scale items revealed a four-factor structure. Factors 1, 2,
3 and 4 accounted for 22, 21, 13 and 11% of the variance, respectively. Factor loadings
ranged from .66-.75 (Fry, 1984). This study is in contrast to Hayslip, Lopez, and Nation
(1991), who found two of the GHS items to have no variance. Their factor analysis
revealed 11 factors that accounted for 73.8% of the total variance; however, the items
were poorly intercorrelated. Overall, the authors suggested the GHS factor structure was
unstable. The internal consistency of the GHS was shown to be moderate (alpha = .69;
Fry, 1984; Hayslip et al., 1991).
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Chapter Three: Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1 through 3 are based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) suggested steps
to identify mediator variables in social psychological research. A mediator is a variable
that explains the relationship between an independent and dependent (i.e., outcome)
variable. Testing mediation involves four steps: (a) showing that the independent
variable is correlated with the dependent variable; (b) showing that the independent
variable is correlated with the mediator variable; (c) showing that the mediator affects the
dependent variable and (d) controlling the mediator variable to show that the relationship
between the independent and dependent variables disappears completely. If Steps 1
through 4 are met, authors suggest complete mediation, whereas meeting the first three
steps suggests partial mediation (Kenny, 2012). Statistically, Baron suggested multiple
regression analyses to estimate the mediation effect. Hypotheses H1 through H4
correspond directly to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommended steps.
H1: The total score on the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1998) will significantly predict the
total score on the BHS (Beck et al., 1974).
According to cognitive theory, early maladaptive schemas play a crucial role in
the development and maintenance of psychological disorders. According to Beck’s
cognitive theory of depression, early maladaptive schemas drive negative thoughts about
the self, world, and future, which he described as the cognitive triad. Negative thoughts
about the future are characterized as hopelessness. Psychopathology results from
maladaptive assignment of meaning to the self, world, and future (Alford & Beck, 1997).
Owing to this theoretical relationship, it is hypothesized that early maladaptive schema
and hopelessness will be positively correlated.
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H2: Total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1999) will significantly predict total
scores on the ICD. That is, there will be a positive correlation between total scores on the
YSQ-SF and the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002).
According to cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997), early maladaptive schema
interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory and
behavioral activity, a process Beck refers to as “cognitive content specificity” (p. 16). As
a result, individuals become susceptible to specific types of cognitive distortions, which,
in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders. Consistent with cognitive
theory, it is expected that subjects who endorse maladaptive schema will also endorse
distorted thinking.
H3: Total scores on the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will predict total scores on the
BHS (Beck et al., 1974).
Cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997) espouses that early maladaptive schema
interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory and
behavioral activity. This interaction makes individuals susceptible to specific types of
cognitive distortions, which, in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders.
Hopelessness is a cognitive state, comprised of both negative thoughts about the future
and the belief that one cannot alter future events. For example, Beck (2002)
characterized the negative view of the future as self-evident in depressed individuals by
both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about the future, and (b) helplessness, or
one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect future outcomes, respectively (Henkel,
et al., 2002; Stotland, 1969). Abramson et al. (1989) also defined hopelessness as the
“expectation that highly valued outcomes will not occur or that highly aversive outcomes
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will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an expectation that no response in one’s
repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these outcomes” (p. 359).
Therefore, it is believed that distorted thinking will be correlated with hopelessness.
H4: The total score on the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will partially, but not
completely, mediate the relationship between total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young &
Brown, 1999) and the BHS (Beck et al., 1974).
Both Alford and Beck (1997) and Abramson et al. (1989) theorized hopelessness
from diathesis-stress perspectives. This model assumes an interaction between both
perceived negative environmental events or stressors and genetic variables, such as
cognitive style or genetic predisposition. Therefore, consistent with the diathesis-stress
models, it is expected that cognitive distortions will be one of a number of variables that
will mediate the relationship between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.
H5: The ICD scales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b) Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d)
Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to Conclusions will predict hopelessness.
H6: The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will demonstrate convergent validity by its
correlation with the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1999) and BHS (Beck et al., 1974).
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Chapter Four: Methods
Overview
Design and Design Justification
This investigation utilized survey research and no identifiers were used to reduce
the risk of creating an identifiable link to subject protected medical information. This
study utilized a correlational research design and mediational model to assess the role of
cognitive distortions, as assessed by the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), as a
mediator between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness. Schema and hopelessness
were measured by the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-SF) and the Beck
Hopelessness Scale (BHS), respectively. A correlational design was chosen primarily
because of its common utilization in the social sciences and efficacy in examining the
direction, strength, and variability of relationships between variables.
Participants
Subjects were chosen from four private mental-health outpatient sites in
Pennsylvania. Completed data from 85 participants were used in this study. To qualify
for the study, subjects had to be able to read and speak English, been aged 18 – 65 years,
and been receiving either mental-health and/or alcohol/substance treatment at the time of
the study. Individuals undergoing corresponding psychopharmacological treatment were
included in this study. Participants with tic disorders, delirium, dementia, amnesic
disorders, schizophrenia, and psychosis were excluded from participating. Interested
prospective volunteers who were participating in other studies or clinical investigations
were excluded from this study. All subjects were made fully aware of the voluntary
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nature of the study, of the possible risks and of their right to withdraw at any time for any
reason. All participant data remained anonymous.
Licensed psychologists, licensed professional counselors and licensed clinical
social workers chose participants according to study inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Therapists explained the study, assessed interest, and distributed and collected the
participant data packets.
Measures
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD)
The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002) is a 69-item, self-report scale that
measures the frequency of an individual’s systematic errors in logical thinking, or
cognitive distortions. Items consist of short sentences that reflect types of distorted
thinking. Individual responses are chosen from a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Often, Always), and response values range from 1 = Never to 5 = Always.
The range of possible scores on the ICD is from 69 to 345. Higher scores indicate higher
frequencies of distorted thinking, while lower scores indicate lower frequencies.
Regarding the instrument’s reliability and validity, the ICD has shown
satisfactory construct validity. Factor analysis revealed 11 factors that closely resembled
10 theory-derived cognitive distortion subscales (i.e., Externalization of Self-Worth,
Fortune-Telling, Magnification, Labeling, Perfectionism, Comparison to Others,
Emotional Reasoning, Arbitrary Inference/Jumping to Conclusion, Minimization, and
Mind Reading) in addition to one nontheory-derived cognitive distortion subscale, which
was labeled Emotional Reasoning/Decision Making (Yurica, 2002). Content validity was
determined by a panel of three cognitive therapy experts, all of whom agreed
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unequivocally on the validity of the original 69 items. Test-retest reliability indicated
very strong consistency over time with total scores of .998 (n = 28, p < .0001).
Concurrent validity is acceptable in that the ICD is significantly correlated with
measures of negative thinking, depression, and anxiety, which will be explained briefly
later. The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) was designed to measure a depressed
person’s negative attitudes toward self, world and others. Items on the ICD were shown
to be positively and significantly correlated to negative attitudes (r = .70, n = 159, p <
.0001). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
are measures of depression and anxiety symptoms, respectively. The ICD was positively
and significantly correlated with both of these instruments (r = .70, n = 161, p < .0001; r
= .59, n = 161, p < .0001, respectively; Yurica, 2002).
Yurica (2002) also found the ICD to have strong criterion validity. Her sample
consisted of clinical (n = 122) and non-clinical (n = 66) participants, and the ICD was
able to significantly distinguish between the two groups (F = 15.2, df = 169, p < .0001).
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS)
The BHS (Beck et al., 1974) is a 20-item, short question scale that was developed
to assess hopelessness, a central component in depression and suicide (Beck et al., 1974).
Responses are indicated by true-false statements. Of the 20 items, 9 are coded false and
11 true. Responses are scored as 0 or 1, and there is a possible range of hopelessness
from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of hopelessness.
Reliability was assessed with a hospitalized psychiatric population (n = 294) and
the internal consistency of individual items was high (r = .93; Beck, et al., 1974).
Durham (1982) found reliability to differ among two clinical samples and one college
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student sample (r = .86, .83 and .65, respectively), suggesting acceptable reliability with
clinical populations. Other studies conducted with college samples have shown better
reliability (r = .85; Chang et al., 1994). Dyce (1996) and Young et al. (1992) found the
internal consistency to be .92, which provided further support for the use of the BHS with
clinical populations. Currently, no studies exist of test-retest reliability with the BHS
(Steed, 2001).
Concurrent validity was assessed by comparing the BHS with clinician ratings of
hopelessness gleaned during patient interviews with other instruments designed to
measure negative attitudes about the future. Two samples were compared, one of general
medical outpatients (n = 23) and the other a psychiatric sample of individuals who had
made a recent suicide attempt (n = 62). The medical outpatient sample had a concurrent
validity of .74 (p < .001) and the psychiatric sample of .62 (p < .001). The BHS has been
correlated with the pessimism item on the BDI and the Stuart Future Test (SFT).
Correlation with the SFT was .60 (p < .001) and with the BDI, .63 (p < .001) (Beck et al,
1974). Alford et al. (1995) showed the BHS significantly correlated with the BDI to
predict later clinical depression symptoms in college and clinical populations. Similar
correlations with depression and hopelessness were found in the literature as well (Rholes
et al., 1985). The BHS has also correlated significantly with psychological stress
measures, hopelessness items on the MMPI-2, the Optimism and Pessimism Scale, and
the pessimism subscales of the Life Orientation Test (Steed, 2001).
Regarding the factor structure of the BHS, the original principal components
analysis revealed three factors, which were feelings about the future (41.7% of variance),
loss of motivation (6.2% of variance) and expectations about the future (5.6% of
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variance; Beck, et al., 1974). This analysis was replicated by Dyce (1996), who also
isolated three factors on the BHS in a sample of 411 outpatients with depression. Noted
that discrepancies in the BHS factor structure have been found (e.g., Marshall et al.,
1992; Ward & Thomas, 1985); however, these studies utilized differing analyses and
response formats which raise questions regarding generalizability of results.
Furthermore, some studies utilize college samples (e.g., Chang et al., 1994; Durham,
1982), which limit inferences that can be made about the data (Steed, 2001). Though the
BHS has been utilized in a number of populations, data suggest it may be most useful
with clinical populations, for whom its use was originally intended (Durham, 1982). This
utilization is possibly the result of to the scale’s inability to detect lower levels of
hopelessness in nonclinical populations (Young et al., 1992).
Young Schema Questionnaire—Short Form (YSQ-SF)
The YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1998) is a 75-question, self-administered
inventory designed to measure 15 early maladaptive schemas taken directly from the 205question Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (YSQ-LF). The schemas are
emotional deprivation, abandonment, mistrust/abuse, social isolation, defectiveness,
incompetence, dependency, vulnerability to harm, enmeshment, subjugation of needs,
self-sacrifice, emotional inhibition, unrelenting standards, entitlement, and insufficient
self-control. Items are scored on a 6-point scale from (1) completely untrue of me to (6)
describes me perfectly. Possible scores range from 75 to 450, with higher scores
indicating a higher presence of maladaptive schema.
A factor analysis of the YSQ-SF (Welburn et al., 2002) determined construct
validity to be adequate for use in a clinical population. The YSQ-SF was administered to
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202 predominantly female subjects (n = 131). Results identified 15 factors that
accounted for 73.1% of the variance. Of the 75 items, 35, 36, 46, and cross-loaded, and
item 38 did not load on any of the 15 factors. Overall, results suggested that the factor
structure of the YSQ-SF is strong.
Waller et al. (2001) studied the YSQ-SF internal consistency with 60 female
subjects with bulimia and 60 healthy subjects and found it to be moderate to high. The
clinical group had an alpha of .96 while the nonclinical group was .92. Authors found no
discernable difference between the YSQ-LF and YSQ-SF. Similar results were repeated
with South Korean and Australian subjects, with alpha levels of .94 and .96, respectively
(Baranoff et al., 2006). Overall, this data suggest the scale has very good internal
consistency. Welburn et al. (2002) conducted an analysis of the YSQ-SF via Cronbach’s
alpha and found coefficients of the 15 scales that ranged from .76 to .93, suggesting
adequate to good internal consistency.
The YSQ-SF has been shown to discriminate among some psychological
disorders. Waller et al. (2001) found that the purging behavior of subjects with and
without bulimia could be significantly distinguished using the YSQ-SF. Authors
determined the YSQ-SF to have adequate discriminate validity. Discriminate validity of
the YSQ-SF was similar to that of the YSQ-LF, with the short form having significant,
albeit a more conservative, discriminant function.
Welburn et al. (2002) examined the YSQ-SF’s ability to predict depression,
anxiety, and paranoia in a clinical population. Authors conducted a series of multiple
regressions to determine the relationship of the YSQ-SF subscales to clinical
symptomology. They used three scales from the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI), a
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measure of psychiatric symptomology. The YSQ-SF subscales predicted 52% of the
variance in anxiety (R = .72, p < .0001), 47% of the variance in depression (R = .47, p <
.0001) and 62% of the variance in paranoia (R = .62, p < .0001). Results suggest the
YSQ-SF has good predictive validity.
Glaser et al. (2002) also examined the predictive validity for psychological
distress of the YSQ-SF using 188 predominantly female (n =132) outpatients. Subjects
completed the YSQ-SF, the Symptoms Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), the BDI, the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory-II (MCMI-II). The YSQ-SF correlated well with the aforementioned
instruments with YSQ-SF scores accounting for 54% of the variance of BDI scores (F =
9.26, p < .001) and 50% of the total variance in anxiety subscales of the SCL-90-R and
the MCMI-II (F = 8.30, p < .001). Like Welburn et al. (2002), these authors suggested
the YSQ-SF has good predictive validity, especially for depression symptoms.
Research suggests that the factor structure of the YSQ-SF is sound. Internal
consistency of the measure has been shown to be adequate to very good, and the
instrument has shown the ability to discriminate between individuals with and without
bulimia. Lastly, the YSQ-SF has the ability to predict psychological distress, including
depression and anxiety. Overall, the scale has adequate reliability and validity and is
effective for use with clinical populations (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).
Procedures
Four private mental-health outpatient sites in Pennsylvania were chosen for this
study. Data were collected from three separate programs within each facility. Rehab
After Work is a licensed intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. The
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Light Program is a mental-health intensive outpatient program. Life Counseling Services
provides traditional outpatient mental-health counseling. Licensed psychologists,
counselors, and social workers from the aforementioned companies were approached to
assess interest in volunteering to distribute the study materials to their clients. Data
gatherers were clear that their participation was purely voluntary and, they could not
ethically be remunerated.
Eight therapists were individually trained on how to approach subjects, provide a
brief rationale for the study, and assure their clients of anonymity of responses. Data
gatherers were briefed on the study and given a copy of the study solicitation letter to use
as a guide when discussing the study with their clients (see Appendix). They informed
their clients that they were helping a colleague collect research data on a study examining
the way that early childhood experiences affect people’s thinking and relate to feelings of
hopelessness. In order to strengthen internal validity, data collectors were not briefed on
the hypotheses of the study.
Subjects who chose to participate were given a packet containing a study
solicitation letter, three questionnaires, and a brief demographic sheet. Subjects
completed the packet in the waiting room of their respective locations and returned it
their therapists. All materials were stored in a locked file cabinet and collected by the
study’s author at the end of each week. Weekly communication with volunteer staff was
kept via email in the event that any questions or concerns arose.
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Chapter Five: Results
A correlational research design was utilized to show the relationship of cognitive
distortions to early maladaptive schema and hopelessness. It was hypothesized that
distorted thinking would partially mediate the relationship between early maladaptive
schema and hopelessness (hypotheses 1 - 4). The four-step mediation model proposed by
Baron and Kenney (1986) was used to determine this relationship.

The approach

involved conducting a simple regression with early maladaptive schema as the
independent variable and hopelessness as the dependent variable. A second simple
regression was conducted with the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions, (ICD; Yurica &
DiTomasso, 2001) as the predictor and hopelessness as the dependent variable. Finally, a
multiple regression analysis was conducted with the ICD (controlling for the mediator)
and early maladaptive schema predicting hopelessness. Rather than follow step 4 to
show mediation, the Sobel Test was utilized. This was used primarily because it is
considered both a more statistically rigorous and common test of mediation (Kenny,
2012). It is currently the highest recommended test for mediation.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that the ICD scales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b)
Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d) Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to
Conclusions would predict hopelessness (hypothesis 5). Lastly, it was believed that the
ICD would demonstrate convergent validity by its correlation with the Young Schema
Questionnaire—Short Form (YSQ-SF; Young & Brown, 1999) and the Beck
Hopelessness Scale (Beck et al., 1974; hypothesis 6).
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Demographic Characteristics
The sample was predominantly male (57%) and Caucasian (75.6%). Being in
treatment was required for participation in the study. Participants were either receiving
treatment for mental health (47.7%), alcohol/substance (33.7%) or both (16.3%). The
majority was taking psychotropic medications for a diagnosed psychiatric disorder
(77.9%). Additionally, a small majority of subjects (52.3%) had been hospitalized at
least once for mental-health reasons. Education levels varied, though the majority had
some college education (32.6%). Table 1 includes demographic characteristics of the
sample.
Hypothesis 1
It was hypothesized that the total scores on the YSQ-SF would predict the total
scores on the BHS. The results demonstrated a moderately significant positive Pearson
correlation coefficient (r = .639, r² = .409, p < .001, one-tailed). This correlation
illustrates a coefficient of determination where approximately 41% of the variation in a
subject’s level of hopelessness could be attributed to differences in the total score on the
YSQ-SF. A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the BHS as the
criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was a significant (F(1, 83) =
57.41, p = .001) predictor of the criterion. As shown in Table 2, the YSQ-SF total score
was a significant predictor of hopelessness.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
___________________________________________________________________
Demographic

Frequency

Percent

___________________________________________________________________
Gender
Male

49

57.6

Female

36

42.4

Caucasian

65

75.6

Asian

2

2.3

African American

9

10.5

Hispanic/Latino

5

5.8

Biracial

4

4.7

Grade school or less

0

0.0

Some high school

4

4.7

High school graduate

20

20.3

Technical/trade

5

5.8

Some college

28

32.6

College graduate

19

22.1

Post graduate

9

10.5

Ethnicity

Education level
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Table 1-cont.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
___________________________________________________________________
Demographic

Frequency

Percent

___________________________________________________________________
Inpatient hospitalization for mental health
Hospitalized

45

52.3

Never hospitalized

40

46.5

Not taking medication

18

20.9

Taking medication

67

77.9

Mental health

41

47.7

Alcohol/substance

29

33.7

Both

14

16.3

Medication

Current treatment

__________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
Simple Regression Analysis of Early Maladaptive Schema and Hopelessness
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
coefficients
coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
1

(Constant)
YSQ-SF total score

-5.524

1.728

.050

.007

.639

t

p

-3.197

.002

7.577

.001

Note: Dependent variable: Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Independent variable:
Young Schema Questionnaire-Short Form (YSQ-SF)

Hypothesis 2
It was hypothesized that total scores on the YSQ-SF would predict total scores on
the ICD. As suspected, results showed a strong positive Pearson correlation coefficient (r
= .843, r² = .711, p < .001, one-tailed). This finding demonstrates that subjects’ levels of
early maladaptive schema explained roughly 70% of the fluctuation in subjects’ cognitive
distortions scores. A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the ICD as
the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant (F(1, 83) =
204.41, p = .001). As shown in Table 3, the presence of early maladaptive schema was a
significant predictor of distorted thinking.
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Table 3
Simple Regression Analysis of the Early Maladaptive Schema and Cognitive Distortions
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
coefficients
coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
1

(Constant)
YSQ-SF total score

54.654

10.248

.555

.039

.843

t

p

5.333

.001

14.297

.001

Note: Dependent Variable: Inventory of Cognitive Distortions, YSQ-SF = Young
Schema Questionnaire-Short Form

Hypothesis 3
It was hypothesized that the ICD would predict hopelessness. The results
revealed a moderate Pearson correlation between these variables (r = .595, r² = .354, p <
.001, one-tailed). The coefficient of determination revealed that 35% of the variability in
hopelessness was attributable to differences in ICD scores. A simple regression using the
ICD total score as the predictor and the BHS total score as the criterion demonstrated that
the overall regression equation was significant (F(1, 83) = 45.5, p = .001). As shown in
Table 4, the ICD total score was a significant predictor of hopelessness.
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Table 4
Simple Regression Analysis of Cognitive Distortions and Hopelessness
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
coefficients
coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
1

(Constant)
ICD total score

-6.658

2.093

.070

.010

T

.595

p

-3.181

.002

6.745

.001

Note: Dependent Variable: Beck Hopelessness Scale, ICD = Inventory of Cognitive
Distortions

Hypothesis 4
It was hypothesized that the total score on the ICD would partially, but not
completely, mediate the relationship between total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young &
Brown, 1990) and the BHS (Beck et al., 1974). As mentioned above, Kenny (2012)
recommends using the Sobel Test to determine the mediating effect of distorted thinking.
To test the ICD as a mediator of the relationship between the YSQ and the BHS
four steps were followed. First, a correlation matrix among all three variables was
conducted which demonstrated multicollinearity between the ICD and the YSQ. Second,
a simple linear regression with YSQ as the predictor and the ICD as the dependent
variable was conducted in order to obtain beta and standard error values to assess
mediation through the use of the Sobel test. The next regression analysis entailed the
BHS as the dependent variable and retaining the YSQ as a control and adding the ICD to
the equation. The beta weight and standard error of the ICD was used as variable b in the
Sobel equation. Lastly, the betas and standard errors from the previous two regression
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analyses were entered in to the Sobel Test formula. The regression coefficient for the
relationship between the independent variable and the mediator was .56. The regression
coefficient for the relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable was .02.
The standard error of the relationship between the independent variable and the mediator
was .04. The standard error of the relationship between the mediator variable and the
dependent variable is .02. The Sobel Test statistic equaled 0.99745870 (p=0.15927096)
supporting the absence of mediation.
Hypothesis 5
It was hypothesized that the ICD subscales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b)
Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d) Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to
Conclusions would predict hopelessness. The hypothesis was not supported, although the
linear combination of the ICD subscales of magnification, fortune-telling and jumping to
conclusions was found to predict hopelessness in study subjects.
A moderately significant Pearson Correlation of the ICD subscale Magnification
and the BHS was found (r = .554, r² = .306, p < .001, one-tailed). The coefficient of
determination revealed that approximately 31% of differences in hopelessness scores
could be attributed to differences in subjects’ scores on the ICD Magnification subscale.
A simple regression using the BHS total score as the dependent variable and the ICD
magnification subscale total score as the independent variable established that the overall
regression equation was significant (F(1, 84) = 36.7, p = .001).
A moderately significant positive Pearson correlation between Fortune-Telling
and the BHS (r = .531, r² = .282, p < .001, one-tailed) was found. The coefficient of
determination revealed that 28% of the variability in hopelessness was attributable to
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differences in subjects’ scores on the ICD subscale of Fortune-Telling. A simple
regression using the ICD Fortune-Telling subscale total score as the predictor and the
BHS as the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant
(F(1, 84) = 32.61, p = .001).
The Pearson correlation between the ICD subscale Jumping to Conclusions and
hopelessness was not significant (r = .158, r² = .025, p < .074). Independently, the
cognitive distortion of Jumping to Conclusions was not shown to predict hopelessness. A
simple regression using the ICD subscale jumping to conclusions as the predictor and the
BHS total score as the criterion confirmed that the overall regression equation was not
significant (F(1, 84) = 2.126, p = .149). As shown in Table 5, the ICD subscale Jumping
to Conclusions was not a significant predictor of hopelessness when examined
independently.

Table 5
Pearson Correlations of the Beck Hopelessness Scale and Independent Subscales of the
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions
_____________________________________________________________________
Subscale
r
r²
p
_____________________________________________________________________
Fortune-Telling
.531
.282
.001
Magnification

.554

.306

.001

Perfectionism

.291

.085

.003

Emotional Reasoning

.266

.070

.007

Jumping to Conclusions
.158
.025
.149
_____________________________________________________________________
Note: Dependent variable: Beck Hopelessness Scale, Independent variable: Inventory of
Cognitive Distortions (ICD)
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Alternatively, when Jumping to Conclusions was combined with the subscales of
Magnification and Fortune-Telling, the combination was shown to significantly predict
hopelessness. Together, these distortions accounted for 40% of the variability in
hopelessness scores. Table 6 demonstrates Jumping to Conclusion scale’s contribution
when combined with the subscales of Magnification and Fortune-Telling.

Table 6
Pearson Correlations of the Beck Hopelessness Scale and Combined Subscales of
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
coefficients
coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
1

(Constant)

-3.695

2.398

Fortune-Telling

.188

.087

Magnification

.388

Perfectionism
Emotional Reasoning
Jumping to Conclusions

t

p

-1.541

.127

.321

2.160

.034

.127

.427

3.058

.003

.068

.141

.050

.481

.632

.184

.213

.093

.864

.390

-.745

.268

-.312

-2.780

.007

Note: Dependent variable: Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Independent variable:
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD)
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Hypothesis 6
It was hypothesized that the ICD would show convergent validity with the YSQSF and the BHS. As predicted, the ICD was shown to measure theoretically similar
constructs to the YSQ-SF and the BHS.
Results of Pearson correlations suggested a strong moderate correlation between
the ICD and YSQ-SF (r = .648, r² = .420, p < .001, one-tailed). More than 40% of the
variance in the total score of the ICD could be attributed to changes in the total score on
the YSQ-SF. A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the ICD as the
criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant (F(1, 83) =
204.41, p = .001), indicating that, as expected, the ICD and YSQ-SF measure similar
constructs.
Similarly, a Pearson correlation between the ICD and BHS suggested a moderate
positive correlation (r = .595, r² = .354, p < .001, one-tailed). The coefficient of
determination revealed that 35% of the variability in hopelessness was attributable to
differences in ICD scores. A simple regression using the ICD total score as the predictor
and the BHS total score as the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation
was significant (F(1, 83) = 45.5, p = .001). This significance suggests that the ICD and
BHS have adequate convergent validity.
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Chapter Six: Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the mediational relationship of
cognitive distortions to maladaptive schema and hopelessness. First, it was believed that
distorted thinking would be one, but not the only, factor to predict hopelessness. Second,
it was believed that there would be a cluster of cognitive distortions related to
hopelessness. This chapter will summarize and expand on the findings of this study, as
well as discuss the implications of the results in light of the existing literature. In
addition, study limitations and suggestions for future research will be explored.
The results from this study found early maladaptive schema and hopelessness to
be associated. This finding is not surprising because early maladaptive schema and
hopelessness are both measured by their cognitive content. This relationship gives
support to the cognitive diathesis-stress model of depression in Alford and Beck’s (1997)
cognitive theory. It espouses that an individual’s cognitive diathesis (i.e., schematic
themes of loss and helplessness) along with personality factors, such as sociotropy,
interact with stressful life events to create a vulnerability to symptoms of depression.
The bias in information processing created by schemas is thought to give way to
cognitive distortions. When distorted thinking includes the cognitive triad, or negative
beliefs about self, world, and future, depression symptomatology is considered likely.
Negative beliefs about the future characterize hopelessness.
This study also found early maladaptive schema to be associated with distorted
thinking and early maladaptive schema and distorted thinking to be highly correlated.
This finding is consistent with Alford and Beck’s (1997) assertion that cognitive schemas
act to bias information processing in a way that produces cognitive distortions. This
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finding is also consistent with Beck and Clark’s (1988) notion of the cognitive triad in
depression. According to cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997), early maladaptive
schema interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory,
and behavioral activity, a process Beck refers to as “cognitive content specificity” (p. 16).
As a result, individuals become susceptible to specific types of cognitive distortions,
which, in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders.
These findings are also consistent with Kendall’s (1992) theory of cognitive
distortions, which espouses that how information is filtered and organized into schematic
structures drives other aspects of cognition, such as distorted thinking. These distorted
thoughts are implicated in triggering a variety of emotions and behavior.
Consistent with cognitive theory, our finding suggests that individuals who endorse
early maladaptive schema are more likely to develop distorted thoughts. This finding is
important to clinical practice because distorted thinking has been implicated in a number
of psychological disorders. This finding highlights the importance of gathering a strong
clinical history of early maladaptive events that may be cognitively misinterpreted.
Thematic beliefs about oneself, the world, and the future are believed to generate
accessible distorted thoughts within a given schematic theme that can be challenged and
modified through cognitive behavioral therapy. This idea is supported by Beck (1964),
Beck, Freeman, et al. (1990), and Padesky (1994), who suggested that schemas could be
identified via their cognitive content. All have encouraged the identification of cognitive
distortions to root out underlying core beliefs related to patient cognitive schemas.
Distorted thinking was found to be significantly related to hopelessness. This
finding suggests that those who frame the future in a distorted way are more likely to
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experience hopelessness. This idea is supported by Beck and Clark (1988) and
Abramson et al. (1989) notions of hopelessness as a group of cognitions about the future.
Beck (2002) characterized the negative view of the future that is evident in depressed
individuals by both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about the future, and (b)
helplessness, or one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect future outcomes
(Henkel, et al., 2002; Stotland, 1969). Similarly, Abramson et al. (1989) defined
hopelessness as the “expectation that highly valued outcomes will not occur or that
highly aversive outcomes will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an expectation that
no response in one’s repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these
outcomes” (p. 359).
Despite significant correlations amongst individual variables, distorted thinking
was not found to partially mediate the relationship between early maladaptive schema
and hopelessness. That is, distorted thinking does not appear to be the predominant
mechanism explaining the relationship between early maladaptive schema and
hopelessness. This finding is inconsistent with Beck’s (1963) emphasis on the mediating
effect of distorted thinking in psychological dysfunction (Beck, 1963). It is also
inconsistent with Abramson et al.’s (1989) theory of hopelessness depression.
This finding is consistent with Haaga et al.’s (1991) review of the cognitive model
of depression. Authors did not find sufficient evidence that the theory differentiated
between information processing bias and distorted thinking. When explained, the
information processing bias refers to an underlying process shift or orientation that
negatively distorts one’s thoughts. This relationship has close similarities to that of early
maladaptive schema and cognitive distortions. In addition, both early maladaptive
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schema and cognitive distortions represent similar cognitive processes. The abstract,
inaccessible nature of early maladaptive schemas limits their ability to be accurately
measured. Methodological problems can also arise when variables are too similar. The
very high correlation between the YSQ-SF and ICD was likely a consequence of
multicollinearity due to the use of a proximal mediator. In other words, the high
correlation could have resulted from both questionnaires measuring the same construct
(i.e., distorted thinking).
The significant finding that the linear combination of the ICD subscales of
Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions was associated with
hopelessness suggests that other specific clusters of cognitive distortions may be
associated with hopelessness. Our study, hypothesized that only five would be related to
hopelessness, which is far from exhaustive. Furthermore, the findings suggest that other
groupings of distorted thinking may be implicated in other disorders.
The relationship of distorted thinking to hopelessness is important to clinical
practice in that the definition implies that distorted thinking encompasses hopelessness in
individuals with depression. So, identification and treatment of distorted thinking as it
relates to hopelessness should be a critical intervention with patients with hopelessness.
In particular, this study found a linear combination consisting of the cognitive distortions
of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions as significantly correlated
with hopelessness. This linear combination gives psychologists insight into the way that
a person’s thoughts distort to contribute to hopelessness.
This study’s findings show that the cognitive distortions of Magnification,
Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions are highly correlated with hopelessness.
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Because hopelessness is so strongly correlated with suicide, measuring for the presence
of this distortion grouping gives practitioners a new risk factor to help gauge suicide risk
in patients. Along with risk factors for suicide, such as suicide attempt history, loss, and
substance use, practitioners have a previously unidentified risk factor to increase their
predictability of suicidal behavior in clinical populations.
This finding gives insight into the thinking patterns of individuals experiencing
hopelessness. These individuals (a) believe they can predict future events, (b) will move
beyond provided evidence to reach conclusions that are invariably negative, and (c) will
view conclusions reached as catastrophic and unbearable.
This finding has practical applications in the field of mental health. In inpatient
settings, treatment teams often have the responsibility of determining patients’
appropriateness for discharge. Treatment providers’ goals may differ from those of
patients. Clients may want to be discharged before it is clinically indicated. Inpatient
hospitalization can be a shameful and embarrassing experience, and patients may not
communicate current suicidal ideation for fear they will remain hospitalized. Being able
to accurately assess a patient’s readiness for discharge therefore becomes imperative to
the inpatient treatment team. The research findings here can be part of a comprehensive
treatment approach that involves identifying distorted thinking associated with
hopelessness and suicide, treating those distortions, and measuring progress.
Utilizing a measure like the ICD could be a critical component in identifying the
distortions of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions. Even without
a statistical tool like the ICD, the practitioner and patient could engage in a conversation
about his/her future during which time the psychologist will listen for language
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representative of the distortions of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to
Conclusions.
Identifying the distortions associated with hopelessness at admission gives staff
psychologists a treatment intervention point. Often patients refer to hopelessness as a
feeling, rather than as a group of thoughts. Treating hopelessness as a group of cognitive
distortions allows practitioners and patients to open these cognitions up to cognitive
behavioral examination and testing. Patients have the opportunity to test and choose their
view of future events and their own self-efficacy to affect those events. For instance, the
thought that only negative events will occur in the future encompasses cognitive errors
(i.e., Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions) that patients can be taught to identify and
challenge.
Posttreatment assessment could be a critical part of the treatment team’s decisionmaking process. Using the ICD at this stage of treatment can give the treatment team a
measureable marker to assess hopelessness in patients. In addition, patient self-report
regarding hopelessness and suicidal thinking during treatment team meetings can be
compared with both ICD data on relevant subscales and ICD endorsements at admission.
This finding has practical applications for outpatient treatment as well. Outpatient
evaluations for treatment services should include an assessment of suicide risk. The
linear combination of distortions identified in this study is an additional risk factor for
suicide that helps to strengthen the predictive accuracy of a suicide assessment. Being
able to more accurately assess suicide risk can inform level of care and treatment
planning.
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In some cases, patients may be reluctant to admit to hopelessness and suicidal
ideation, especially when the legal system or family members influence a person’s
decision to enter treatment. Shame about having a mental illness and suicidal thoughts
may inhibit patients from disclosing thoughts they have. With measurements of the
linear combination of Magnification, Fortune-Telling, and Jumping to Conclusions,
practitioners have more objective insight into a person’s thinking. This cognitive risk
factor for hopelessness, along with emotional and behavioral risk factors for suicide,
gives practitioners a clearer sense of a patient’s needs.
Hopelessness can be treated in regular therapy sessions once identified. Patients
can be educated about how the combination of Magnification, Jumping to Conclusions,
and Fortune-Telling predicts hopelessness. Treatment with cognitive behavioral therapy
teaches patients to identify these distortions in their thinking, challenge them, and replace
them with more realistic alternatives.
Cognitive behavioral treatment of hopelessness can have effects in drug and
alcohol settings as well. Helping patients to decrease hopelessness has implications for
their belief in their ability to reach their goals of sobriety. Alerting patients to the linear
combination of the Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions as they
relate to hopelessness and teaching them to treat these thoughts with cognitive behavioral
therapy gives patients with drug and alcohol problems a skill to maintain sobriety through
treatment and beyond.
In summary, though this study did not provide find distorted thinking to mediate
early maladaptive schema and hopelessness, it did lend further support to the cognitive
model. First, significant relationships between early maladaptive schema, distorted
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thinking and hopelessness were found. There is evidence that individuals who endorse
early maladaptive schema also endorse distorted thinking. Distorted thinking was
significantly related to hopelessness and a significant relationship between early
maladaptive schema and hopelessness was found.
In addition to these findings, the cognitive distortions of Magnification, FortuneTelling and Jumping to Conclusions were, when combined, significant contributors to
hopelessness. Considering the strong association of hopelessness with suicide, this
finding has important treatment implications for the assessment and treatment of
individuals with hopelessness as well as practical practice applications. It gives
psychologists a new measurable risk factor in the assessment of suicide that can be used
in both inpatient and outpatient settings.
This study provided further support for the ICD in terms of convergent validity
with the YSQ-SF and BHS. The literature on the ICD suggests it is a strong
psychometric instrument for the measurement of distorted thinking in research settings.
The findings suggest that the ICD, YSQ-SF, and BHS could be critical tools in treatment
settings for patient assessment and treatment.
Study Limitations
One significant limitation to this study is the abstract nature of early maladaptive
schemas. The literature shows a significant variation in their definitions. The strong
correlation between the YSQ-SF and ICD in this study may be explained by the similarity
of the constructs being measured. The high correlation could result from both
questionnaires measuring distorted thinking.
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Though the ICD has been shown to be a strong instrument in research settings,
psychometric properties still need to be evaluated. Particularly, the instrument should be
factor analyzed with a larger sample.
Finally, this study utilized self-report measures, which have potential limitations.
Research suggests that self-report measures require subject interpretation, which can vary
significantly and can be further impacted by affective state. In addition, denial, poor
insight, and self-preservation raise validity concerns with self-report measures (Kazdin,
1998).
Directions for Future Research
The significant finding that the linear combination of the ICD subscales of
Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions was associated with
hopelessness suggests that other specific clusters of cognitive distortions may be
associated with hopelessness. Our study, hypothesized that only five would be related to
hopelessness, which is far from exhaustive. Furthermore, the findings suggest that other
groupings of distorted thinking may be implicated in other disorders.
The ICD has shown to be a strong instrument in research settings, and further
exploration of its psychometric properties is needed. Critical to the investigation of the
instrument would be factor analysis using a larger sample.
Rosenfield (2004), who also used the ICD in his research, highlighted the fact that
the ICD only significantly accounted for variance among variables measured. With this
said, cognitive theories of depression and hopelessness suggest that a complex
relationship of variables (e.g., biological, genetic, social, environmental, or
physiological), or combinations of variables, interact to contribute to psychological
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dysfunction. Further exploration of additional variables should be the subject of future
explorations.
Conclusions
Despite its limitations, this study has revealed a number of significant findings.
They include the relationship of cognitive distortions to both early maladaptive schema
and hopelessness.
Additionally, the combination of predicting future events negatively (i.e.,
Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions) along with overinflating the significance or
severity of outcomes or one’s inability to influence those outcomes (i.e., Magnification)
appears to significantly influence the development of hopelessness. Identification of
Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions, and Magnification with a measure like the ICD
is a critical component in a comprehensive assessment of potential suicidality. Because
hopelessness is so highly correlated with suicide, this study’s findings suggest that this
linear combination of cognitive distortions, along with other factors, is a significant risk
factor for predicting suicidal behavior. Early assessment of these cognitive distortions
would provide focus for cognitive behavioral treatment of hopelessness and suicidal
ideation.
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Appendix
Dear Volunteer:
My name is Keith Milligan, I am a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Psychology
at the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM). I am doing a research
study examining the way that early childhood experiences affect the people’s thinking
and possibly lead to hopelessness. By participating, you may feel some personal
satisfaction having taken part in research that may improve the quality of health care for
clients who seek treatment for emotional difficulties at Life Management.
I would be thankful if you would complete the attached questionnaires. Completion of the
Young Schema Questionnaire, Inventory of Cognitive Distortions and the Beck
Hopelessness Scale is expected to take about 20 minutes. These surveys have been used
in past research in psychology with no ill effects. While there are no known or expected
risks to participating in this study, there may be some emotional discomfort. This
discomfort is expected to be minimal and brief from completing the questionnaires about
personal thoughts, feelings and psychological symptoms.
Participation in this project is voluntary. Furthermore, all information you provide will
be confidential; you are not asked to put your name on any of the questionnaires. If you
choose to participate and you become concerned by your level of emotional discomfort, a
toll-free hotline will be included with your packet that you may contact to assist you with
support.
If you would like to take part in this study, please return the completed questionnaires
and keep this letter. If after receiving this letter, you have any questions about this study,
or would like more information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation,
please feel free to contact Dr. Robert DiTomasso at (215) 871-6511. However, please
know the final decision about participation is yours. Should you have any comments or
concerns resulting from your participation in this study, you can also contact PCOM’s
Research Compliance Specialist at 215-871-6782. Thank you for your interest in this
project.
Respectfully,

Keith Milligan, MA, MS, LPC
Responsible Investigator

Robert A. DiTomasso, PhD, ABPP
Chairman, PCOM Department of
Psychology

